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Abstract
This thesis explores the relationship between compensation committee presence
and chief executive o cer salaries in firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo
Axess. Using a self-collected, unbalanced panel data sample consisting of 76 compa-
nies spanning from 2007 to 2015, we have gathered observations of CEO salaries and
compensation committee presence. We have applied standard econometric methods
to measure the e↵ect of compensation committees and incentive-based salaries. Our
results suggest that firm size and owner concentration are more likely to impact pro-
portion of incentive-based salary than compensation committee presence. Moreover,
larger companies are found to be more likely to have implemented compensation
committees. We find that the proportion of incentive-based pay has a significant
positive impact on the size of CEO remuneration, while we find partial support for
an e↵ect of compensation committees presence on the size of CEO pay.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
In this thesis, we will explore whether the presence of a compensation committee is likely
to lead to higher pay-for-performance sensitivity for the salary of chief executive o cers
(CEOs) in firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) and Oslo Axess. Furthermore, how
has this relationship a↵ected total CEO salaries?
The salary of CEOs has been a topic of discussion since the 1990s (Economist, 2000),
when the use of stock programs, stock options, and bonuses for executives led to a rapid
increase in total CEO compensation. Typically, CEO pay is determined by negotiations
between the CEO and the board, on behalf of the shareholders (Randøy & Strøm, 2014).
Some firms have delegated these tasks to a sub-committee; the compensation commit-
tee (Conyon & Peck, 1998). Larger companies tend to have larger and more competent
boards and are therefore more likely to implement these sub-committees than smaller firms
(Randøy & Skalpe, 2010). Compensation committees are typically found in enterprises
listed on stock exchanges. Ideally, this committee will meet several times a year to discuss
the implementation of remuneration schemes and means of motivation for the CEO. In the
US and the UK, the use of compensation committees is strongly recommended (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act; UK Corporate Governance Code), after several independent researchers found
these committees to be helpful in attaining ”good” compensation packages for CEOs (Cad-
bury Committee report; Greenbury report). Thus, compensation committees are meant
to help the board implement independent and thorough remuneration policies. On stock
exchanges in the US, such as New York Stock Exchange,1 and Nasdaq,2 implementation
of a remuneration committee is mandatory. At the time of writing, Norwegian firms are
not required to implement compensation committees, but norsk anbefaling for eierstyring
og selskapsledelse Section 9, recommends the use of these sub-committees, similarly to
the UK Corporate Governance code.
Present literature on compensation committees is mainly based on the Anglo-Saxon
governance system. This thesis attempts to extend this research to Norwegian firms and
1https://www.nyse.com/governance
2https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/MaterialHome.aspx?mcd=LQ
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explore the relationship between compensation committee presence and CEO salaries. An
indication of support for a significant association between compensation committees and
CEO salaries could be useful for firms considering to implement these measures.
The salary of CEOs still attract significant attention, and news outlets regularly
report updates of CEO salaries perceived to be extreme. One recent example is the pay
of Google CEO Sundar Pichai in 2016 who earned USD 199.7 Million in 2016,3 of which
fixed salary only were USD 650 000. In Norway, the CEO of Opera Software ASA Lars
Boilesen, received NOK 31 Million in 2016.4 According to Dagens Næringsliv, Boilesen
has received a total of NOK 150 Million during the last seven years, making him one
of the most highly paid CEOs on Oslo Stock Exchange. Both Opera and Google have
established compensation committees, which according to leading scholars should a↵ect
CEO remuneration, all else equal. A well-designed compensation program has three
primary purposes (Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004, p. 19):
1. Attract the right executives at the lowest costs,
2. Retain the right executives at the lowest costs,
3. Motivate executives to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid
actions that destroy value.
Our research question is: Does the presence of a compensation committee impact
the salary of CEOs in firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess?
We have performed tests to infer a relationship between compensation committee
presence and the proportion of incentive-based salary. We have also analyzed the rela-
tionship between the ratio of incentive-based salary and total salary, and compensation
committee presence and total CEO pay. For this purpose, we have gathered data from
firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess between 2007 and 2015. There is
some uncertainty as to whether the amount of performance related salary is due to firm
size or compensation committee presence, and whether larger companies, in general, are
more likely to have implemented compensation committees. We have made an attempt to
assess this possibility in our thesis. We have measured CEO salaries on two dimensions,
3https://www.dn.no/nyheter/2017/05/03/0948/Teknologi/han-tjente-like-mye-som-1800-
storebrand-ansatte
4https://www.dn.no/nyheter/2017/05/03/1335/Finans/opera-sjefen-har-tjent-150-millioner-kunne-
tjent-mye-mer (subscription required)
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based on the Securities and Exchange Commission standard (Murphy, 2012):
• Fixed salary, comprised of base salaries, benefits in kind, and pension agreements.
• Incentive-based salary, comprised of bonus, stock option, stock grants, and long-
term incentives.
1.2 Theoretical foundation
Building primarily on agency theory, we expect compensation committee presence to
increase the proportion of incentive-based salary due to agency theory’s dominance as
an explanatory theory regarding CEO remuneration. Furthermore, we are analyzing the
relationship between the ratio of incentive-based wages and total CEO salary, expecting
to find a positive relationship, since management power theory predicts that boards are
unable to control managers. According to this view, bonuses and other incentive-based
pay do not replace or substitute for other remuneration, but it is instead a form of rent
extraction by executives. Finally, we believe that inertia, social norms, and habits will
induce compensation committees to impact CEO salaries, expecting the market to value
these actions.
We would expect companies that link CEO pay to financial returns to regularly out-
perform those that do not. According to agency theory, the inclusion of incentives for
CEOs to increase shareholder value will result in long-run benefits for the company. How-
ever, Randøy and Oxelheim (2005) found no significant relationship between incentivized
salary and financial returns. These findings may indicate that the actual benefit of com-
pensation committees is control of public perception and reduced social outrage due to
salaries perceived to be unreasonably high. Similarly, Randøy and Nielsen (2002) found
no significant relationship between market-based measures of returns and CEO pay in
Norwegian and Swedish firms. In a meta-analysis, Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia
(2000) found that around 5% of CEOs salaries were explained by stock returns, while firm
size accounted for over 40% of the variance.
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1.3 Limitations
The sample consists of self-collected, non-random observations of firms listed on Oslo
Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess from 2007 to 2015. We have gathered all data manually.
Therefore, there are some issues with regards to validity and reliability.
We have not been able to validate our observations against other samples. Due to the
lack of, or non-enforced reporting standard for salaries, we are also unable to state with
certainty whether our figures represent the present value of future options or the actual
value of exercised options in the reporting periods. Also, several firms have not reported
the primary data of interest in our study, and therefore we removed these companies from
the sample. Survival bias may be present in our sample, due to firms being bankrupted,
delisted, or insu cient reporting standards. Companies delisted within the period have
rarely made their financial statements available. Therefore, we were unable to obtain
relevant information for these firms. Another possible bias may be due to larger companies
preparing more informative and transparent reports. We have performed tests for bias
in our sample against a group of companies left out of the original sample. In total, our
sample consists of 76 firms, while the out of sample group consists of 29 firms.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
Section 2 outlines previous research on the development of compensation committees, and
CEO salaries in the US and Norway. Section 3 contains a summary of existing theories
on executive remuneration. Section 4 details how we collected data, what type of data
methods we used, and how we have controlled for skewed data and bias. Section 5 outlines
and assesses the data with regards to the statistical methods used, while Section 6 contains
our results and robustness tests. In Section 7 we present a discussion and conclusion, with
suggested future research.
4
2 Literature review
2.1 Development of compensation committees
Compensation committees are meant to increase board independence from the CEO in the
pay-setting process, in order to reduce CEOs impact on their pay (Conyon & Peck, 1998).
Clearly, there is no quick fix to the agency problem of CEOs. Several non-observed
factors impact both executive remuneration and behavior independently, such as CEO
personality and how risk-averse the CEO is, board independence, and length of board
service, for example. In the 1980s, several researchers began recommending that boards
should have a particular focus on CEO remuneration schemes and the establishment of
compensation committees. Williamson (1985, p. 313) remarked that ”Unless an inde-
pendent compensation committee exists, for example, an understanding of the contract
between firm and manager is complicated by the fact that managers apparently write
their contracts with one hand and sign them with the other.” The increased attention
paid to CEO remuneration has led to several distinct research focuses. Some examples
are pay-for-performance sensitivity (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), social comparison processes
(O’Reilly III, Main, & Crystal, 1988), CEO pay slice (Bebchuk, Cremers, & Peyer, 2011),
behavioral agency theories (Pepper & Gore, 2015), and CEO pay as a result of a Lake
Wobegon e↵ect (Hayes & Schaefer, 2009). In this context, the Lake Wobegon e↵ect im-
plies that CEO salaries rise because boards believe that the market values highly paid
executives. A higher compensation is thought to signify a competent CEO.
Jensen (1993, p. 862) stated that ”the job of the board is to hire, fire and compensate
the CEO, and to provide high-level counsel.” The task of deciding upon compensation is
often delegated to a sub-committee (Conyon & Peck, 1998), intended to focus on aligning
the interests of CEOs, the board, and ultimately shareholders (Main & Johnston, 1993).
However, grounded in Kahneman and Tversky’s anchoring theory, some researchers has
questioned the e↵ectiveness of compensation committees (O’Reilly III et al., 1988, p. 271).
They remarked that committee members anchor their beliefs on fair pay, social norms,
and ”self-referential starting points” based on pay in their own firms, and then possibly
increasing these figures. Main and Johnston (1993) presented support for this view.
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They found that executives in companies where compensation committees were present
received significantly larger pay packages. Finally, in line with the Lake Wobegon e↵ect,
some researchers have developed a ”bidding-up” hypothesis, wherein relatively underpaid
CEOs experience salary increases, while ”overpaid” CEOs experience no parallel pay
reduction (Conyon & Peck, 1998).
In the UK, the Cadbury Committee Report (1992) Article 4.42 stated: ”boards
should appoint remuneration committees, consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive
directors and chaired by a non-executive director, to recommend to the board the remuner-
ation of the executive directors in all its forms, drawing on outside advice as necessary.” In
2003, a Norwegian workgroup consisting of representatives from 9 separate organizations
was established to work on a new recommendation for codes of conduct in the corporate
governance of Norwegian companies, norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse.
Since January 1st, 2015, the organization has consisted of 8 organizational members. It is
also a member of European Corporate Governance Institute, a network established to im-
plement guidelines for corporate governance in countries within the European Economic
Area. The establishment of standard corporate governance guidelines focused particularly
on companies registered on stock exchanges. Companies listed on Oslo Stock Exchange
and Oslo Axess handle a substantial part of both growth and wealth development in the
Norwegian society. It is in the stakeholders best interest that companies comply with cer-
tain routines, procedures, and guidelines that allow for further growth and development
(Br̊athen, 2006). Section 9 in norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse recom-
mends that compensation committees should be selected to ensure fair and independent
treatment of CEO compensation, similarly to the Cadbury committee report and the UK
Corporate Governance code. In general, norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse
follows a ”comply or explain” principle. The Norwegian standard is legislated by Norwe-
gian Accounting law §3-3b, which states that companies should clarify its practice and
policy for corporate governance.
2.2 Historical review of CEO salaries
Measuring how well a manager is performing relative to his salary or a firm’s profitability
is problematic, as determining the CEOs impact could be nearly impossible. A CEOs
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impact will rarely be apparent until several years into the reign, with a few possible ex-
ceptions. For example, some researchers have found evidence of write-o↵s in the first
year of newly hired-CEOs (Nikolai, Bazley, & Jones, 2010). According to prevailing mo-
tivational theories, owners must align executives’ interests with their own. That should
maximize company value and incentivize CEOs to make optimal, value-creating decisions.
The board’s monitoring is often restricted due to limited available time for board mem-
bers, and executives have more insight into day-to-day business issues and opportunities.
Management is, therefore, better able to evaluate these than owners that rely on the
management’s information. According to Jensen et al. (2004), companies should focus
on creating remuneration schemes that encourage top management to act in ownership’s
best interest. In other words, instead of solely focusing on the size of CEO compensation,
they should focus on:
1. total benefits,
2. composition of the benefits,
3. relation between pay and performance, the pay-for-performance sensitivity.
In the US, inflation adjusted CEO compensation increased from USD 850 000 in 1970
to over USD 14 Million in 2000, before declining to USD 9.4 Million in 2002. Much of
the increase was due to a substantial growth in the use of option grants, where average
values grew from close to zero in 1970 to USD 7 Million in 2000, before declining to USD
4.4 Million in 2002. However, average executive cash remuneration, i.e. fixed salaries and
bonuses, also increased from USD 850 000 to USD 2.2 Million from 1970-2002 (Jensen
et al., 2004, p. 24). Interestingly, the increase and reduction in performance-related pay
seem to align with years of boom and decline of the general economy. We will discuss this
further in our descriptive analyses in Section 6.
During the 1980s, shareholders began demanding more shareholder value and aggres-
sively handling firms’ that did not deliver this (Murphy, 2012). Accordingly, companies
began unloading unprofitable branches and investments. Enterprises resisting change
were often bought out and liquidized. In turn, firms started lobbying for stronger protec-
tion against ”corporate raiders” earning exorbitant sums on these transactions (Murphy,
2012). The hostile takeovers made firms more aware of the role of corporate governance
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and agency problems. Thus, companies began to focus more on these issues, rewarding
profitability and desired behavior, rather than determining pay based on firm size. Addi-
tionally, incompetent CEOs were left with less money to waste (Murphy, 2012). Increased
literature on agency problems from academia induced firms to increase the equity pay-
ments of CEOs to raise alignment of interests. Investors hoped that this would reduce poor
investments intended to build empires since CEOs would then su↵er themselves.
The movement also led to an increased focus on the role of board members and
calls for board independence. At the end of the 1990s, the number of independent board
members had risen to 80% in the US, from around 50% previously (Horstmeyer, 2016).
The increased independence of board members had not reduced the use of options, lend-
ing support for those believing that boards are more focused on interest alignment than
restraining CEO salaries (Murphy, 2012). According to Jensen et al. (2004), the mas-
sive increase in the use of options in US companies was partly due to Securities and
Exchange Commission’s regulations of disclosure and tax rules that reinforced stronger
links between stock performance and executive pay, and increased focus on equity-based
compensation. They also contend that corporate boards fail to comprehend, or do not
care, how costly the options are - because US legislation does not demand inclusion of
option grants in profits and loss statements. However, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue
that increased CEO compensation is mainly due to increased management power, and
not any misunderstanding of the actual cost of option grants. According to their paper,
bonuses and equity payments are treated as an added incentive and do not replace the
fixed salary.
2.3 CEO Salaries in Norway
Norwegian CEOs has experienced a substantial increase in total salary since the 1990s:
An average yearly increase of 16% in the years between 2004 and 2008, while the average
Norwegian employee received an increase of below 5% (Randøy & Skalpe, 2010). Although
the growth of executive salary in Norway has been rapid, Norway’s egalitarian structure
has led to a relatively small CEO-employee wage gap (Randøy & Nielsen, 2002), and the
gap is still relatively modest compared to most other countries (Randøy & Skalpe, 2010).
It may also be wise to consider the years leading up to the end of Randøy and Skalpe’s
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study, which were ”boom” years for the Norwegian economy (Randøy & Skalpe, 2010). In
the years following 2008, CEO salaries had a more random fluctuation, before increasing
again after 2013 (Gitmark, 2015). In 2013 and 2014 the average CEO was paid 124% of
an average worker’s salary, while the figure was rising slightly to 130% in 2015 (Norsk
ledelsesbarometer, 2016). The wage gap between CEOs and employees has not decreased
since 2010, and as in most other developed countries, the wage gap is still increasing
(Piketty, 2014).
The use of options in Norwegian companies has, similarly to US firms, increased
since the early 1990s. From practically non-existent, until comprising 34% of total CEO
remuneration in 2005 (Randøy & Skalpe, 2007). The Norwegian tax authorities have
implemented a tax on future benefits of stock option grants to reduce the problem of
”hidden” CEO salary increases (Randøy & Skalpe, 2007). The legislation alleviated the
problem somewhat, but firms were able to bypass the option benefit restriction by im-
plementing a strike price at market value, with 1% monthly increase. Thus, the options
had no taxable value at grant date for the CEO (Randøy and Skalpe, 2007). The Norwe-
gian government is an unusually large shareholder in Norwegian firms compared to other
governments. In 2006 the government put a halt to option payouts to CEOs in busi-
nesses where the Norwegian state was the majority shareholder, forcing companies with
large state ownerships to settle any remaining option agreements immediately.5 This, in
turn, led to a massive public outrage when the CEO of Hydro, Eivind Reiten, received
options amounting to nearly NOK 28 Million. Eivind Reiten later renounced NOK 8
Million.6
Some scholars have cited the increased foreign ownership in Norway and other Scan-
dinavian countries as a contributing factor to the growing use of options and bonuses for
CEOs (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005; Norsk Ledelsesbarometer, 2016; Randøy & Nielsen,
2002). In 2004, Norwegian authorities published the first draft of norsk anbefaling for
eierstyring og selskapsledelse, intended to both direct and support the corporate gov-
ernance structures in large Norwegian companies. Norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og
selskapsledelse follows a ”comply or explain” principle, in which companies registered to
Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess shall either follow regulations, or explain why they
5https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nye-retningslinjer-for-statens-holdning-/id437736/
6http://www.dn.no/nyheter/energi/2007/08/06/reiten-gir-slipp-pa-atte-millioner
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di↵er from the standard. The standard requires firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange to
determine and disclose their guidelines for executive salary, while the use of compensa-
tion committees is non-mandatory. There are three main approaches to the theoretical
discussion of CEO salary in Norway (Randøy & Skalpe, 2010):
1. The distribution perspective focuses more on equality, and the perceived ”fairness”
of salary, and possible social discord concerning high CEO salaries.
2. The owner perspective, which could be considered part of agency theory, wherein
the problem of asymmetric information is present. Therefore, CEOs must be paid
to act in shareholders’ best interests.
3. The economic growth perspective focuses on how CEO salaries impact macroeco-
nomic growth in general by signaling that well-performing firms will lead to CEO
rewards. This reasoning has weak empirical support and is less used than the first
two.
The most popular reasoning for high CEO salaries has two primary contentions (Git-
mark, 2015): The first argument for a large CEO wage gap is that CEOs are more
skilled and have more responsibility than the average worker, and deserves fair compen-
sation. Secondly, it is a competitive market, and firms have to pay the going rate for
the best CEOs. Research performed by Kuvaas (2005) challenged this view. He found a
significant discrepancy between what motivated respondents themselves, and what they
expected others to be driven by. Respondents would often state a challenging job was
their primary motivation for switching jobs, rather than a salary increase. However, when
asked what they expected others to be motivated by, the same respondents typically cited
salaries (Gitmark, 2015). Furthermore, Randøy and Skalpe (2010) found that low cross-
border hires of CEOs have led to weak international competition and less direct impact on
Norwegian CEO salaries. Increased foreign ownership may a↵ect CEO wages, especially
due to a lower pay gap sensitivities and more familiarity with equity-based pay.
Some researchers have questioned the notion of a market value of CEOs. First,
boards will typically hire consultants to organize the process. These consultants are hired
and often paid a commission based on the new CEOs salary. Therefore, they will have
incentives to try to increase the pay for the new CEO by either pursuing highly paid
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executives or impacting the compensation by other means (Conyon, 2011; Peetz, 2015).
Secondly, no one can accurately determine the market value of a CEO, since these jobs
are rarely available and even less regularly openly advertised (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).
Finally, Randøy and Skalpe (2010) criticized the hiring process of CEOs, wherein the
CEOs are selected and often announced before finalizing salary negotiations. These situ-
ations provide the candidate with possibilities of opportunistic actions, such as extreme
wage demands. Executive salary packages in listed firms are often very complicated and
contain several elements. For our purpose, we have selected six forms of compensation.
Three of them are classified as fixed, and three are incentive-based, or performance related
(Murphy, 2012):
Table 2.1: Salary components
Type of salary Description Classified as
Base salary Not dependent on performance and will not fluctuate unless re-negotiated Fixed
Benefits in kind
Car allowance, free use of telephone, etc. Not dependent on performance,
included in the CEOs negotiated salary agreement.
Fixed
Pension costs Will often exceed minimum requirements by law for CEOs. Fixed
Bonus
For performance tied to firm relative or absolute performance, and may be
measured in numerous ways.
Incentive-based
Share options
The CEO is permitted to buy stocks at a predetermined price, at a
predetermined point in time. This has zero downside for the CEO.
Incentive-based
Stock grants
The CEO is granted stocks in the company. This is intended to increase
CEO ownership, induce ”skin in the game”, and reduce agency problems.
Incentive-based
Long term
incentives
The CEO is required to spend her bonus on stock in the company,
and hold for a predetermined number of years.
Incentive-based
Own representation based on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) guidelines (Murphy, 2012)
CEO prospects of alternative employment will impact the level of salary a firm is
required to o↵er to recruit and retain top talent. Both the size and the composition of
remuneration packages vary widely between years, di↵erent industries, and by firm size. In
industries with many job opportunities, especially in big and traditionally international
industries, CEOs may be tempted by bigger salaries and opportunities in either larger
Norwegian firms, or abroad. As an example, Helge Lund, the former Statoil CEO resigned
in February of 2015 to become the CEO of British Gas at a massive salary increase. After
the employment agreement had been made public, public outrage forced British Gas
to reduce the value of stock grants from GBP 10M to GBP 4,7M.7 Recently, Dagens
Næringsliv reported that Lars Boilesen, the CEO of Opera Software had turned down
7http://e24.no/jobb/statoil/helge-lund-begynner-i-ny-jobb-foer-tiden/23391687
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generous o↵ers from foreign firms to remain chief executive o cer of Opera. While his
salary is large relative to other Norwegian companies, the chairman of Opera stated that
his salary is in the ”fourth division” of international IT companies, indicating that he
could have earned far more as CEO of another firm.8 Clearly, the salaries of executives
require extensive attention by boards of large firms, and we believe that an analysis of
the e↵ect of compensation committee establishment is highly relevant to firms considering
implementing this committee and complying with the Norwegian Corporate Governance
code guidelines.
8https://www.dn.no/nyheter/2017/05/03/1335/Finans/opera-sjefen-har-tjent-150-millioner-kunne-
tjent-mye-mer (subscription required)
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3 Theory
Several theories have attempted to explain the development of executive remuneration.
Baumol (1967) claimed that US firms paid their executives as public bureaucrats, with
low levels of pay-for-performance sensitivity, and that salaries were mostly dependent on
company size rather than profitability (Randøy & Strøm, 2014). Baumol (1967), and later
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Murphy (1990)
argued that CEOs should receive salaries with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity.
The increased sensitivity was meant to align the interests of management and owners,
and changes came in the form of stock options grants, stock grants, and bonus schemes.
This induced boards and compensation committees to increase the use of equity-based
payment during the 1980s, which led to an explosive executive salary increase in the US,
outpacing profitability by a large margin (Randøy & Strøm, 2014).
The two main theories used to explain the increase in CEO salaries have been agency
theory and management power theory. These are not mutually exclusive, and according
to Frydman and Jenter (2010), one should consider these as complementing approaches
rather than rigidly adopting one of them. Murphy (2012) states that the policies im-
plemented in the 1990s were a↵ected by agency theory, and allowed self-serving CEOs
to extract rent. However, policies intended to reduce agency problems, such as inde-
pendent board members, have created new agency problems between the shareholders
and the board. There are several di↵erent stakeholders in these processes; shareholders,
government, boards, CEOs, and the general public. An overemphasis on various and com-
peting theories may have led researchers to ignore policies implemented by governments
as a response to CEO salaries. At the same time, these policies may have a↵ected the
development in itself (Murphy, 2012).
3.1 Agency theory
Agency theory was developed in part by Baumol (1967), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and
Fama and Jensen (1983), and has been the dominant theory used to explain CEO salary
and its relation to corporate governance (Main, Jackson, Pymm, & Wright, 2008). In cor-
porate governance systems, there are many examples of the principal-agent relationship,
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e.g. between owners and the board, and the shareholders and other stakeholders. In this
thesis, we are focusing on the relationship between the board and the CEO. According
to agency theory, management and owners have di↵erent interests, and executives are
self-serving. It is used to describe situations wherein the principal (owner) engages an
agent (CEO) to act on his behalf, and the two parties’ interests do not coincide. The
primary objective of the board and owners is long-term value maximization, while the
CEOs objective is to reach the long-term goals set by the board through the daily oper-
ations. Furthermore, agency theory presumes a level of asymmetric information between
the principal and the agent. The board’s lack of control over the day-to-day operations
gives the CEO a better understanding and more information about company operations.
Thus, moral hazard may be an issue. Assuming both parties are utility maximizing, any
situation where there is a di↵erence in preferences or information will lead to conflicts of
interest. This, in turn, may lead to the agent making suboptimal decisions on behalf of
the principal. The di↵erence in value between the actual choice made by the CEO and
optimal decision for owners is defined as residual cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
The income of executives is dependent on their compensation from the company,
which relies on the firm’s survival. Meanwhile, owners can diversify their investments and
will prefer the company to take on some risks to achieve higher returns on their invest-
ment. To alleviate the moral hazard problem, the CEO is either monitored or motivated
through compensation, though both are generally required. Most researchers agree that
monitoring is costly and reduces CEO motivation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, in-
centive schemes intended to induce desirable behavior are preferable. By incentivizing the
CEO to reach a predetermined goal, the board induces the CEO to act in the best interest
of ownership. Agency theory relies on another assumption of arms-length contracting, in
which owners are required to develop remuneration schemes to incentivize executives to
maximize shareholder value at the lowest possible cost.
According to Bruce, Buck, and Main (2005), the key metric of CEO contracts is
the pay-performance sensitivity. Therefore, the board should design the remuneration
scheme to 1) align interests, and 2) develop a strong pay-performance sensitivity. The
optimal contracting model assumes that management and owners have di↵erent interests
and that executives are self-serving. It relies on the previously mentioned assumption of
arms-length contracting, in which owners are required to develop remuneration schemes
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to incentivize executives to maximize shareholder value. Thus, CEOs are paid the optimal
amount, i.e. the necessary amount needed to attract the most skilled agent for the position
as CEO. The contract is intended to maintain CEO motivation in the future, as well
as making him act predictably and obeying the intentions of the board (Holmström &
Milgrom, 1987). According to Bruce et al. (2005), board members both interact with
and are dependent on information from management. However, social forces a↵ect the
assumption of arms-length negotiation.
3.1.1 Empirical support
Agency theory has been the primary theoretical approach to CEO salary research since
the 1970s, and numerous studies have attempted to explore the relationship between the
composition of CEO wages and the profitability of firms. Jensen and Murphy (1990) found
that for every USD 1 000 change in shareholder wealth, CEO wealth changed by USD 3.25.
They contended that restraints implemented by the US government hindered the pay-for-
performance sensitivities of CEO contracts, leading to sub-optimization of the value of
incentives. Hall and Liebman (1998) presented evidence of CEOs pay-for-performance
sensitivity having increased rapidly during the 15 years preceding their study. Their
results indicated that CEO wealth sensitivity was much larger than Jensen and Murphy’s
study from 1990.
Scott Wallsten (2000) found that executives typically had a higher pay-for-performance
sensitivity than average employees. The agent should be able to impact the performance
of which he is being measured, which is an important feature of the incentivized motiva-
tional framework. Therefore, the e↵ect of rewarding firm profitability is reduced as one
moves down the hierarchy. Lower-level employees rarely impact this measure to a sig-
nificant degree. Furthermore, Wallsten found that CEOs were rewarded for good years,
while not being punished for years of average or lower profitability. According to agency
theory, this should reduce risk aversion and increase firm profits (Wallsten, 2000). How-
ever, when incorrectly applied it can lead to undesirable consequences (Gerhart, Rynes,
and Fulmer, 2009). Gerhart et al. (2009) remarked that increasing pay-for-performance
sensitivity can be a powerful and helpful tool as long as the contract is correctly de-
fined. However, if the contract is not su ciently specified, it can lead to several possible
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unintended consequences. Therefore, they concluded that no perfect fit-for-all solutions
exist, and the board needs carefully evaluate the potential rewards and pitfalls of CEO
contracts.
3.1.2 Criticism
The ultimate goal of for-profit organizations is generally to maximize return on capital.
Therefore, one would expect to find a significant relationship between correctly applied
pay-for-performance sensitivity and firm profitability. However, several studies have been
unable to find any close relationship between profitability and salaries of CEOs. Research
has found either non-significant or negligible positive or negative relationships (Berrone
& Otten, 2008; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005; Tosi et al., 2000). Bebchuk has been a notable
critic of agency theory (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Bebchuk & Fried 2003; Bebchuk,
Grinstein & Peyer, 2010; and Bebchuk, Cremers & Peyer, 2011) and has presented several
arguments and empirical results conflicting with the optimal contracting approach. Critics
of agency theory contend that the agency problem may not only exist between the board
and the CEO but that there are further agency issues between owners and the board.
Bebchuk et al. (2002) theorized that this was due to the board members wanting to
keep their positions and were increasing the likelihood of this happening by satisfying the
incumbent CEO. Social interactions and friendship between members of the board and
the incumbent CEO may also impact board members. Furthermore, the assumed market
forces of CEO labor markets may not be strong enough to create e cient CEO salaries
in general.
Murphy (2012) stated that institutional investors and active shareholders had in-
creased pay-for-performance sensitivity for CEOs. These forces have shifted management
from an accounting based view to a focus on market returns. The pay-for-performance
schemes have led to further agency problems, since CEOs are able to barely beat targets.
They will often get paid either way. In turn, they are more likely to surpass targets in
several periods to maximize the likelihood of receiving bonuses, rather than present value
as soon as possible. Similarly, CEOs of firms where goals are not attainable have taken
”heavy hits” in order to maximize the likelihood of producing profits in the following
years (Murphy, 2012). Since stock markets focus on expected returns, management has
16
opportunities and incentives to increase expectations to receive their bonuses (Murphy,
2012). In support of this criticism, Lie (2005) found evidence of abnormal stock returns
shortly after CEOs received option grants. He concluded that the e↵ect was evident and
increasing over time, in both scheduled and unscheduled awards. However, the e↵ect was
stronger when option rewards were unscheduled. Accordingly, he suggested that CEOs
either are becoming increasingly skilled at forecasting future market developments, or a
backdating of option grants occur. Researchers have found a relationship between the
value of options given to the CEO and financial restatements (Murphy, 2012). Bruce et
al. (2005) criticized agency theory for becoming ”overly narrow,” and thereby reducing
cross-country application of principles.
3.1.3 Behavioral agency theory
In later years agency theory have been criticized for being unable to adequately explain
both the variation of CEO compensation, and CEO behavior in relation to profitability
and returns by focusing on monitoring costs and interest alignment (Pepper & Gore,
2012; Randøy & Strøm, 2014). In response to this, behavioral agency theory has become
a popular theoretical framework. Behavioral agency theory argues that the motivation of
the agent (CEO) is the primary driver of interest alignment. Motivation could be attained
through other means than purely monetary rewards (Randøy & Strøm, 2014; Pepper &
Gore, 2012). The main point is that the view of financial rewards through compensation
packages as a quick fix is too simplistic.
Behavioral agency theory suggests several adaptations to the original agency theory
to illustrate the fact that CEO motivation is more complex than previously thought. The
assumption of CEO discounting the value of long-term incentive plans is critical to behav-
ioral agency theorists, and the framework relies on the presumption of risk-averse agents
that values immediate rewards more highly than uncertain rewards in the future (Pepper
& Gore, 2012). Benefits are required to be vast to induce the expected motivation in the
CEO. Issues of bounded rationality may also be present, wherein the CEO is unable to
adequately value complex remuneration schemes and thereby undervalue the salary. Fur-
thermore, CEOs tend to be a↵ected by an ”inequality factor” and perceptions of fairness,
i.e. CEOs may dislike and lose motivation by unreasonably high remuneration.
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3.1.4 Hypothesis 1
Agency theory predicts that the principal and agent will have di↵erent interests. Since
most available research has focused on agency theory and alignment of interests between
the participants, most practitioners are likely to support these theories. Therefore, we
believe that the presence of a compensation committee with the sole purpose of determin-
ing the CEO salary in order to align interests will increase the use of performance related
pay.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a compensation committee leads to a larger proportion of
incentive-based salary for CEOs.
3.2 Management power theory
Building on the assumption that agency theory is under-socialized, researchers have ana-
lyzed CEO compensation focusing on the executives receiving payment, rather than the
owners developing the payment scheme (Bruce et al., 2005). Agency theory assumes ratio-
nal decision-making, wherein the board determines acceptable results, and then rewards
these after the fact. Management power theory states that boards are unable to control
and determine executive salary. This line of research argues that ”pay regimes are an
artefact of socially-derived executive power” (Bruce et al., 2005, p. 1495), designed for
CEOs to extract rent from other stakeholders. In other words, CEOs seek to maximize
benefits while minimizing the risk of payment and are self-serving. Salary schemes are,
according to this theory, a camouflage of rent extraction, i.e. CEOs have an incentive
to obscure and attempt to legitimize their rent extraction (Bebchuk et al., 2002). CEO
salaries are mostly limited by ”social contracts,” or the outrage of the general public when
CEO compensation is perceived to be extreme.
Management power theory is grounded in the research of Berle and Means (1932)
and Jensen and Meckling (1976). According to Bebchuk et al. (2002), the managerial
power approach is not meant to replace the optimal contracting approach. Instead, the
theory complements and helps explain e↵ects that optimal contracting has been unable
to account for. Management power theory also questions the assumption of arm’s length
principle for negotiations between the CEO and the board. Even if market forces a↵ect
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executive compensation, these forces are unable to compel the optimal contract approach
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). As a result, CEOs can use their power to influence compensation
arrangement and extract rent.
Bebchuk et al. (2002) recommended that boards counteract these e↵ects by reducing
board dependence on management. This could be achieved by reducing time served on
boards, using non-employees and independent hires as board members, and reducing
board memberships on other companies where the CEO has relationships with executives
(Randøy & Strøm, 2014). Section 8 of norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse
recommends at least some independence from management for board members, but this
independence could simply be considered a formality in many instances. It does not
necessarily eliminate the issues of reliance on management information. Boards should
instead attempt to attain better information and improved control of executives, to create
better compensation packages and schemes with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity.
Implementation of compensation committees with a sole focus on CEO performance and
their appropriate remuneration could achieve this (Randøy & Strøm, 2014). It is also
possible to benchmark against comparable firms, or adjusted for macroeconomic e↵ects.
According to management power theory, remuneration schemes should also avoid short-
term bonuses. The board could reduce the risk of rent extraction by primarily using
long-term incentives (Randøy & Strøm, 2010).
3.2.1 Empirical support
Building on research showing that company size is closely related to executive salary,
researchers have found that CEOs often prioritize mergers and acquisitions that are not
necessarily profitable for shareholders. This enables them to ”build empires”, and achieve
better reputation and higher salary (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Randøy & Strøm, 2014; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1993). This e↵ect has been more
common in the US than in Norwegian firms. Due to the dispersed ownership of US firms
compared to Norwegian companies, the individual share owners has less power in US com-
panies. Core, Hulthausen, and Larcker (1999) found that ownership structure and board
size has a significant impact on CEO salaries. Further supporting the management power
view, research has found indications that income over which the CEO has no control,
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influence CEO pay in the same way as other income (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2003), this evidence of ”lucky dollar payments” under-
mines the agency theory’s view of rational contracting processes. If CEOs are rewarded
for creating profitable firms, as the optimal contracting approach states, lucky dollars
should not be rewarded equally to relatively good performances compared to benchmark
competitors.
The pool of prospective CEOs for most large firms is typically slim. In order to
hire the most competent CEO, companies hire consultants to locate the most talented
CEOs (Murphy, 2012). The CEO is often selected before salary negotiations have begun,
leading to increased bargaining power for executives. Bebchuk et al. (2002) remarked
that these negotiations often are held between a professional negotiator on behalf of the
CEO and the compensation committee or HR department of the firm. In these instances,
Bebchuk et al. (2002) believed that management power theory was dominant since the
HR department knew that the new CEO soon would be able to a↵ect their situations.
Thus, they might be willing to grant excessive compensation.
3.2.2 Criticism
One of the leading agency theorists, Holmström (2005) evaluated the management power
model in a historical perspective. He stated that the model had several fair and thorough
propositions. For example, the use of short-term options, wherein CEOs are allowed to
unwind early and have incentives to manipulate the share price. However, he believed
that the model was unable to adequately explain the development of CEO pay, or replace
the present models completely. Management power theory contended that CEO power
has increased since the 1980s. Holmström (2005) disagreed with this proposition, stating
that it probably had decreased. According to Murphy (2012), every measure of board
independence has improved since the mid-1980s. Furthermore, the rise in CEO salaries
during the 1990s boom should have been mirrored by a similar increase during the 1960s
boom for the theory to hold, according to Holmström (2005). This did not occur. Holm-
ström (2005) believed that the theory could be better served focusing more on the agency
problem between the board and shareholders, and increased shareholder power. This
relationship, he felt, may have impacted board behavior in the pursuit of ”shareholder
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value.” Holmström (2005) further questioned the assumption of arms-length contracting,
and the ability of boards to determine CEO value without having benchmarked accurately
against comparable firms. He held the belief that CEO pay rise was somewhat a↵ected
by the increased demand for talented CEOs, but the primary drivers had been increased
institutional pressure and greater shareholder influence. The new type of shareholders
focused on shareholder value. This forced boards to develop pay schemes to induce CEOs
to increase shareholder value, typically by stock and option grants. This, in turn, led
to several high-profile examples of myopic and outright fraudulent behavior, and cases of
share value influenced decisions and processes in large firms, such as Enron, Worldcom,
and KPMG (Jensen et al., 2004).
Support for agency theory was presented by Edmans and Gabaix (2009), stating
that the optimal contracting approach was able to explain pay-increases, low pay-for-
performance sensitivity, and pay-for-luck adequately. They point to the lack of significant
di↵erence between firms with dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership, where
management power assumes a di↵erence in corporate governance mechanisms. With re-
gards to the ”new CEO problem,” Murphy (2012) stated that the overpayment of outside
hires was an agency problem, where the boards were paying with shareholder money. He
contends that it is not a managerial power problem since boards are not held captive.
Rather than focusing on increased board independence, the solution could be improved
negotiation processes (Murphy, 2012). Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998)
were unable to find support for a positive relationship between the size of CEO compen-
sation and ”captured” committee members. Furthermore, Murphy (2012) believed the
”problem” of overpaying for a talented CEO was less critical than hiring a less talented
one. Salaries for lawyers, investment bankers, hedge-fund managers, venture capitalists,
private-equity managers and athletes follow the same pattern as executive compensation
(Kaplan & Rauh, 2010). This development is attributed to market e↵ects. Therefore,
Murphy (2012) believed that it was unproductive to attribute gains in other comparable
sectors to another explanation than for executives.
Although Bebchuk and Fried (2003) strongly disagreed with the notion that boards
were unable to determine the economic costs of granting options accurately, Murphy
(2012) contends that many practitioners and board members he had interviewed have
confirmed this view. Furthermore, he stated that 95% of options granted were not given
21
to the CEO of firms, but to lower level employees and that this was inconsistent with the
management power-view, wherein CEOs exploit boards with these arrangements. There-
fore, Murphy (2012) believed that his statement about the misunderstood alternative cost
still was the most likely answer. New York Stock Exchange’s listing requirements could
help explain Murphy’s findings. Companies were able to bypass shareholder votes for
option plans by granting to a su cient percentage of eligible employees in addition to
management (Murphy, 2012).
3.2.3 Hypothesis 2a
Management power predicts that boards are unable to control the salary increase for
CEOs, due to multiple factors, such as owner dispersion, friendship, inertia, and agency
problems between owners and the board. Theorists subscribing to this model believe that
CEOs are able to extract rent from firms, and are only kept in check by fear of reactions
by the general public, and other endogenous factors. Based on this, we believe that a
higher proportion of incentive-based salary should result in higher wages in general.
Hypothesis 2a: More incentive-based pay leads to higher total salary.
3.3 Neo-institutional theory
Some theorists believe that common remuneration schemes are caused by institutional
norms, ”rules of thumb,” and inertia (Main et al., 2008). This leads to an apparent simi-
larity between compensation plans, ”with a strong tendency towards imitation” (Main et
al., 2008). Heavily impacted by sector and country norms, boards, perhaps subconsciously,
do not want to act unconventionally (Main et al., 2008). For example, Westphal and Za-
jac (1993) found that a significant number of firms in the US adopted long-term incentive
plans in the 1990s, but the actual substance of these programs was limited. Furthermore,
their results indicated that early adopters had a higher likelihood of attempting to put the
plans to use to reduce agency costs. Firms that adopted these plans at a later stage were
less likely to implement these plans fully, indicating that these measures may have been
symbolical (Westphal & Zajac, 1994). When deciding upon pay packages boards will typ-
ically ”go with the norm,” to avoid having to justify their decisions publicly. Traditional
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schemes from one culture, country or industry will then be transferred and applied in
another setting with slight adaptations, which in many instances may lead to suboptimal
pay packages (Main et al., 2008). This line of thinking opposes with traditional beliefs
that boards customize specific remuneration schemes to link pay and performance for
every firm. It does not refute traditional agency theory or management power theories
entirely, though it o↵ers an explanation of the apparent standardization of compensation
packages and suggests that boards are influenced by bounded rationality (Main et al.,
2008).
3.3.1 Empirical support
The neo-institutional framework focuses on rent extraction and remuneration schemes.
Peetz (2015) concluded that status, norms and endogenous factors are the reason for
overpaid CEOs, and reducing compensation would conflict these internal and external
expectations. Further supporting this theory, Berrone and Otten (2008) found evidence
of higher gaps between CEO remuneration and average salaries in countries and cultures
where di↵erences in a social hierarchy are more accepted. Hayes and Schaefer (2009) have
proposed a Lake Wobegon e↵ect, wherein the market is thought to value highly paid CEO,
as found by Peetz (2015). This leads firms to pay more than the average CEO salary to
appear to have a skilled CEO to the market.
According to Peetz (2015), there exists a ”relative pay deprivation”: CEOs rate them-
selves as being above average and therefore deserving of higher relative salaries compared
to other comparable CEOs (Dierynck & Renders, 2014). This leads to ”pattern bargain-
ing,” wherein executives aim at a salary above the mean of the reference group. In turn,
this creates a ”ratcheting e↵ect.” Whenever one CEO exceeds the average CEO salary,
others will bargain to earn higher salaries as well. Similarly, a 1992 study in Australia
found that other CEO salaries were the most important determinant in CEO pay-setting,
not shareholder interests (Peetz, 2015).
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3.3.2 Criticism
Greenwood, Hinings, and Whetten (2014) argued ”that institutional theory has become
so preoccupied with the institutional level of analysis that it has lost sight of” studying
organizations, treating them as though they were all the same. Therefore, they proposed
a return to the comparative analysis of organizations in order to recognize and under-
stand organizational di↵erences. Kostova, Roth and Dacin (2008) remarked that the
neo-institutional theory has ”fallen short in understanding the theoretical implications of
the multinational corporation context.”
3.3.3 Hypothesis 2b
Since neo-institutional theory predicts a significant inertia in CEO compensation, we
believe boards will act according to norms, and rarely deviate from traditional remunera-
tion schemes. However, a sub-committee designated to monitor and incentivize the CEO
should impact CEO salaries, compared to firms where the entire board or a single member
handles CEO compensation as a side duty. Accordingly, we expect compensation com-
mittee presence to be likely to introduce di↵erent salary schemes than comparable firms
without compensation committees.
Hypothesis 2b: Compensation committee presence leads to higher total salary.
3.4 Conceptual framework
Based on this discussion, we will be testing three hypotheses related to the theories and
their influence on CEO pay. Our research question is: Does the presence of a compen-
sation committee impact the salary of CEOs in Norwegian publicly listed firms?, and our
hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a compensation committee leads to a larger proportion of
incentive-based salary for CEOs.
Hypothesis 2a: More incentive-based pay leads to higher total salary.
Hypothesis 2b: Compensation committee presence leads to higher total salary.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework: Hypothesis 1
Figure 3.2: Conceptual framework: Hypothesis 2
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4 Data
4.1 Methods, research design
This thesis has been written using quantitative research, which allows researchers to
present social phenomena using numbers instead of words. Researchers are then able to
infer causality and present support for theories (Wooldridge, 2010). We have used a longi-
tudinal design for our study. Since we gathered data from firms with a di↵erent number of
years included, it is classified as unbalanced panel data (Brooks, 2008, p. 487). However,
all firms included in our sample have at least three years of complete information to avoid
misrepresenting information based on outliers. Panel data allows the researcher to ana-
lyze and monitor relationships between variables, and control for unobserved cross-section
heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010). Since compensation committees are not mandatory for
Norwegian firms, tracing of e↵ects of these committees is made possible by di↵erences
within the sample. For hypothesis 1 we have used t-tests and regression analyses to
analyze the relationship, while we used regression analyses for hypothesis 2.
Some bias may be present in our sample, since CEO pay reporting is not stan-
dardized, in spite of norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse recommendations.
Larger companies seem to have more detailed and transparent reports, perhaps due to
fear of reactions by investors and the public. Additionally, firms delisted from Oslo Stock
Exchange have been excluded due to missing reports. Therefore, survival bias may be
present. We have taken steps to assess the bias, using four control variables. Section 4.2
and Appendix, Section E presents the di↵erences between our sample and firms left out
of our sample.
4.2 Population, sampling and possible bias
Methods of data collection includes surveying annual reports, the Titlon-database de-
veloped by University of Tromsø,9 and accounting information were collected from Pro↵
Forvalt.10 Both CEO compensation and compensation committee information were ob-
9https://titlon.uit.no/
10www.forvalt.no
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tained from firms’ annual reports. Market capitalization and dividends have been retrieved
from the Titlon-database, while debt ratio primarily has been gathered from forvalt.no,
which contains accounting reports from Norwegian companies. Some accounting figures
were verified by surveying annual reports, due to missing or insu cient information at
www.forvalt.no. Firm sectors are based on Oslo Stock Exchange’s reporting.
Table 4.1: Firms included per year, and number of firms with and without compensation
committees
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of firms 43 48 51 57 63 68 74 74 74
With compensation 19 23 28 30 38 43 48 48 49
Committee
Without compensation 24 25 23 27 25 25 26 26 25
committee
Relative use 44% 48% 55% 53% 60% 63% 65% 65% 66%
As seen in Table 4.1, the number of observations of compensation committees, and
the relative use of compensation committees have increased between 2007 and 2015, in-
dicating that a larger proportion of firms are adhering to norsk anbefaling for eierstyring
og selskapsledelse.
The relevant population for our thesis is all companies listed on Oslo Stock Ex-
change or Oslo Axess between 2007 and 2015. However, due to mergers and acquisitions,
bankruptcy, insu cient reporting (Gitmark, 2015; Norsk Ledelsesbarometer, 2016), and
company turnover on Oslo Stock Exchange, we were unable to obtain information on sev-
eral firms. The entire sample consists of 76 firms, with di↵erent numbers of years included.
A significant number of the companies listed between in the years between 2008 and 2012
were delisted before 2015. This has led to a few possible biases, which we attempted to
measure using four di↵erent standard variables; Debt ratio, Owner concentration, Stock
return and Market capitalization.
The out of sample group consists of companies removed from our original sample
due to insu cient reporting. It contains 29 individual firms, with at least three years
included for each company. It consists of firms excluded from the original sample due
to inaccurate or missing information for the primary variables, such as compensation
committee presence and valuation of bonuses or stock grants. We gathered information
from Titlon, Pro↵ Forvalt, and annual reports, to obtain complete sets of variables for the
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firms left out of sample. There is a significant di↵erence between our sample and the out
of sample group for owner concentration and market capitalization, and non-significant
di↵erences for debt ratio and stock returns. A list of companies included in our samples
and t-tests for di↵erences between our sample and out of sample group have been reported
in the Appendix.
We expected to find a significant di↵erence in size between our sample and the out
of sample group, for at least two reasons: 1) Larger firms will generally prepare more
transparent and comprehensive reports, and are therefore more likely to be included in
our sample (Main & Johnston, 1993), and 2) larger firms tend to survive, while the
mortality of smaller companies is higher. As mentioned, several firms listed in 2007 have
since been delisted, and several firms listed in the years between 2008 and 2012 have been
delisted before 2015.
4.3 Operationalized variables for hypothesis 1
The variables used in our analyses of the hypotheses are presented below, along with a
description of why we included them, transformations and possible issues. If the same
variable is used in more than one hypothesis, we have shortened the description in the
following section. When testing hypothesis 1 we used a t-test, and Tobit, ordinary least
squares, and fixed e↵ect regression to infer causality and discern possible endogenic e↵ects.
Therefore, we operationalized several variables for this hypothesis.
4.3.1 Proportion of incentive-based salary (dependent variable)
Since our first hypothesis states that firms using compensation committees have improved
the alignment of CEO and shareholders interests through more performance-sensitive
remuneration schemes, we have gathered information about fixed and incentive-based
salaries for every firm. Fixed salary includes base salary, benefits in kind and pensions,
while incentive-based salary includes bonuses, options and stock grants, and long-term
incentive agreements. Please refer to Section 2 for in-depth explanations. Due to firm size
a↵ecting both total salaries and therefore total incentive-based pay, we have chosen the
proportion of incentive-based salary as our dependent variable. The variable is measured
28
as a ratio. The dependent variable has severe issues with regards to kurtosis and skewness,
and there are multiple observations with zero value, as seen in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Proportion of incentive-based salary.
4.3.2 Independent variables
We believe that firms, where the compensation committees have been established, are
more likely to increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Compensation committee has
been included as a categorical (dummy) variable (Conyon, 1997; Conyon & Peck, 1998;
Main & Johnston, 1993). As mentioned, norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse
states that Norwegian listed companies should either establish a compensation committee,
or explain why they have deviated from this recommendation. Therefore, nearly all
firms have stated whether or not they have implemented the committee. We were able
to retrieve information for every firm and year included in our sample. In total, we
found 326 observations where compensation committee had been implemented, while
in 226 observations the committee was not present. For some firms, the compensation
committees were implemented during the surveyed time frame.
Table 4.2: Compensation committee observations
Compensation Average Number of Average number
committee present CEO salary observations of firms per year
Yes 7 177 696 326 36
No 4 072 017 226 25
Firm size typically impacts both the size of the compensation and the complexity
of the remuneration scheme (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Jensen & Murphy, 1993; Randøy &
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Strøm, 2014). Since large firms tend to have larger and more competent boards, these
firms are also more likely to implement more sub-committees and adhere to the recom-
mended guidelines (Main & Johnston, 1993). Both due to the perceived benefits, and
social contracts (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Therefore, we deemed it necessary to include
this variable in the multiple regression models to determine whether larger firms tend to
have a larger proportion of incentive-based salary, independently of the implementation
of compensation committees. Firm size is measured by market capitalization. However,
revenues, the number of employees, total assets and several other measures have been
used in previous research (Randøy & Nielsen, 2002). In the robustness tests in Section
6.5, we have measured size by assets instead of market capitalization. We have included
stock return as a control variable, since we expect executives to be rewarded for profitable
years (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989; Tosi et al., 2000). Stock return has been
calculated by the standard formula:
Stock return =
Market capitalizationt-1  Market capitalizationt +Dividendst
Market capitalizationt-1
Owner concentration is measured by the accumulated ownership of the five largest
shareholders. Previous literature has indicated that a higher concentration of ownership
should, all else equal, lead to lower total salary and less need for interest alignment through
performance-related salaries (Randøy & Strøm, 2014). Agency theory predicts that higher
owner concentration should result in a lower proportion of incentive-based salary since
owners are willing to spend more time on monitoring, and free riders are less of a problem
(Grossman & Hart, 1980; Randøy & Skalpe, 2007; Randøy & Strøm, 2014). In other
words, higher owner concentration will often lead to more active shareholders (Randøy &
Strøm, 2014). Thus, the need for interest alignment may be reduced. However, Edmans
and Gabaix (2009) did not find substantial di↵erences in governance mechanisms with
di↵erent degrees of dispersed ownership. All Norwegian firms are required to report the 20
largest shareholders in their annual fiscal reporting, so this figure is readily available for our
sample firms. Due to changes in the proportion of incentive-based salary between the years
of our sample, we included years as a control variable for inter-year deviations.
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4.4 Operationalized variables for hypothesis 2
4.4.1 Total CEO salary (dependent variable)
The variable total CEO salary is heavily influenced by company size, type of industry, year,
in addition to several non-observed factors (Randøy & Strøm, 2014). There are severe
issues of both kurtosis and skewness present for the variable total CEO salary, mainly
due to some observations of high CEO wages. This problem has also led to researchers
often preferring to use the median instead of mean values when analyzing variables with
this type of distribution. For our model, we have normalized the variable by applying the
natural logarithm, which has reduced the issues of extreme observations and outliers in
regression.
4.4.2 Independent variables
We included firm size in hypothesis 2 due to the close relationship between company size
and size of CEO salaries. Please refer to Section 4.3.1 for further information and reason-
ing for inclusion. The absolute value of incentive-based salary is heavily a↵ected both by
the size of total compensation and firm size. We added a dummy variable for a change
of CEOs since we included the total salary of both CEOs in these instances. Moreover,
Murphy (2012) states that compensation committees almost invariably pay ”too much”
for newly appointed CEOs. Years has been included as a control for inter-year variations,
measured as dummy variables. We have also included the variable compensation commit-
tee presence since these committees are the focus of our thesis, and we believe that these
committees may impact salaries. Owner concentration has been included for the same
reasons as in Section 4.3.1. We have measured debt ratio by the ratio of total liabilities to
total equity at the end of each accounting period. While debt ratio not necessarily directly
impacts profits, and might even reduce accounting profits, some theorists believe that a
higher debt ratio disciplines management and forces them to provide higher returns to
service the debt (Bøhren, 2012; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Randøy & Nielsen, 2003). This
reduces possibilities of investing in unprofitable projects or extracting rent. Therefore, we
have included this variable as a control variable. The variable is measured as a ratio and
is generalizable to all firms in the sample without any transformation.
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4.5 Data transformation
To reduce the problem of outliers and distribution of errors, we have transformed several
variables in our regression models. According to Ringdal (2013, p. 424) transformation of
variables has two main functions, 1) reduce the impact of skewed distribution and extreme
observations, and making extreme observations more symmetrical, and 2) Enhancing the
theoretical fit of the model since a value change will be measured in percentages and
not absolute values. Transformation could be achieved by transforming the variables
or removing observations. However, Brooks (2008) remarks that researchers must take
caution when removing outliers since they represent actual values and researchers are
in danger of misrepresenting true relationships. This might lead to researchers creating
an artificial fit to infer a relationship between variables (Type I error). We have log-
transformed several variables. This has improved the fit of our variables by reducing the
e↵ect of outliers, and variance.
Due to the ratio scale, we do not believe any transformation of the variable owner
concentration is required. Stock return is measured as a percentage figure, which should
increase generalizability compared to absolute values. However, due to mergers and acqui-
sitions, market fluctuations and other macroeconomic influences, some values were found
to be extreme. Naturally, a significant share of the observations was negative. When
transforming the variable, we first had to standardize and add 2 to every observation
to achieve only positive values without skewing the relative relationships between obser-
vations. Finally, we applied the natural logarithm to reduce variability and impact of
extreme observations. We have used the natural logarithm on market capitalization to
lessen the possibility of outliers and extreme values distorting the results. However, the
variable is still not normally distributed.
When analyzing and testing our sample, we found some extreme values and outliers.
After performing tests and visually observing these values, we have removed six years of
observations from the sample: 1) we removed 2007-2009 for Kongsberg Gruppen due to
extreme variations in stock returns, and 2) American Shipping Company was removed
due to extreme debt ratios and stock returns. We believe this to be justified due to the
strong influence and distortion of extreme observations, and their e↵ect on the regression
model as a whole. Other than these six observations, none have been removed.
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5 Econometric theory and analyses
Non-observed factors a↵ecting the dependent variable are often present in research on
social phenomena. Profitability may depend on macroeconomic changes, CEO motivation,
CEO salary, loss of contracts or clients, and so on. To reduce noise and lessen the impact
of endogenous factors, we have gathered data for every company over several years. This
enabled us to measure changes and tendencies within companies, as well as between years
and firms.
5.1 Tobit
It is not uncommon to find variables with limited observation range in econometric analy-
ses, such as variables that cannot possibly be negative (Brooks, 2008), e.g. investment in
research and development, military spending, and hourly salary. Variables such as these,
with an actual and observed limit, are typically referred to as censored data, and will
typically have a cluster of observations at, or close to the limit (Brooks, 2008; Greene,
2012; McDonald & Mo tt, 1980). However, there are instances where these limits are
synthetic, and observations of the variable above threshold limits are not reported at
their actual value. Researchers might have created an arbitrary maximum range; this is
truncated data. One commonly used example of this is the measurement of car speeds,
where the speedometer was previously capped at 120 mph in many vehicles. However, it
was still possible to exceed this limit in most cars.11 Truncated data may then present
sample selection issues since the researcher cannot know if observations present actual
population means. Stata does not produce fixed e↵ect Tobit models, so we have used
the random e↵ects model. The random e↵ects Tobit model is presented as (Wooldridge,
2010, p. 708):
yit = max (0,  + X it1* 1 + X it2* 2 + ... + X itk* k + xi⇠ + ↵i + µit),
t = 1, 2, ... , T
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the variable is highly skewed due to non-negative obser-
vations, and a large number of zero observations, in other words, censored data (Greene,
11https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/sas/output/truncated-regression/
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2012 p. 891). Thus, we applied the Tobit model, censoring at zero. There were 135 ob-
servations of zero, out of a total 545 observations. The Tobit model does not only predict
a cluster of zeros (or limit values) but a grouping of observations close to the limit value,
as well (Greene, 2012, p. 895). As seen in Figure 4.1, the dependent, variable propor-
tion of incentive-based salary, fulfills these requirements. According to Greene (2012), re-
searchers have often computed ordinary least squares estimates in these instances, despite
their inconsistency. Ordinary least squares estimates will ”almost without exception” pro-
vide lower coe cients than maximum likelihood estimates (Greene, 2012). Since a large
number of observations are at zero, a change in independent variables will not lead to
appropriate changes in the dependent variable (Greene, 2012). A possible solution to the
grouping of variables at, or close to, the limit is an exclusion of limit values. However, this
would lead to potentially valuable information being lost (Brooks, 2008). In our sample,
we would have lost 135 of 545 observations. Additionally, creating a synthetic cut-o↵ of
observations may reduce the censoring problem, but ordinary least squares regression will
a↵ect the error term of the regression, and the error term would be correlated with ex-
planatory variables (Brooks, 2008). The estimates would still be inconsistent and biased.
Therefore, while solving the issue of clustering at the limit and censoring problems, we
would have created a truncation problem (Greene, 2012).
According to Brooks (2008, p. 536), the Tobit model has two significant limitations:
1) It is much more sensitive to heteroscedasticity and non-normality issues than regular
ordinary least squares regression (Arabmazar & Schmidt, 1982; Wooldridge, 2010), which
will lead to biased and inconsistent results. 2) The model is based on a grouping of values
close to the limit, not only limit observations. To counteract the first problem, we have
applied a bootstrap method to create robust standard errors in Section 6. The second
issue has been discussed in a previous paragraph and, as seen in Figure 4.1, should not
be a problem in our model.
5.2 Ordinary least squares
The normal method of analyses for panel data is regression (Brooks, 2008). There are four
main types of regression analyses: 1) Ordinary least squares, 2) fixed e↵ects, 3) random
e↵ects, and 4) random parameters (Greene, 2012, p. 386). In this thesis, we have applied
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ordinary least squares and fixed e↵ects regression. The ordinary least squares regression
model is often presented as (Wooldridge, 2010):
y =  0 +  1X1 +  2X2 + ... +  kXk + µ
Where X1, X2, ...Xk are the independent variables, while  0 indicates the constant,
and  1 to  k indicates the direction and impact of independent variables. µ is the unex-
plained error.
In ordinary least squares regression, a fitted line predicts the relationship between
one dependent and one or more independent variables. In other words, the fitted line is
the best available prediction of the variance in the dependent variable and is estimated
by the independent variables (Brooks, 2008). The lower the observed variance, the more
variation of the dependent variable can be explained by independent variables (Brooks,
2008). For ordinary least squares regression to present reliable results, some assumptions
need to be fulfilled (Brooks, 2008). The intuition behind the assumptions will be explained
in this section, while tests of the assumptions are performed in the Section 5.2.1.
5.2.1 Ordinary least squares assumptions
Linearity - If the regression is to provide reliable results, there should be a linear rela-
tionship between the dependent and independent variables. If the relationship between
the variables is not linear, the fitted regression line misinterprets the variance (Brooks,
2008).
Homoscedasticity - Homoscedasticity relates to the variance of error terms. Ideally,
the variance of errors is constant, i.e. not changing or deviating from the fitted line
as the independent variables change (Greene, 2012). Homoscedasticity can be checked
by visually assessing plot of observed error values, and using Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg, and White’s tests for heteroscedasticity. If this assumption is not fulfilled,
it could seriously a↵ect the standard error terms and the validity of predicted values.12
However, the presence of heteroscedasticity is not uncommon, and models that account
for the e↵ect exists.
12http://www.statisticssolutions.com/homoscedasticity/
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Multicollinearity - If multicollinearity is present, two or more of the independent
variables have a strong correlation (Greene, 2012). This may inflate the relationship
between individual independent variables and the dependent, leading to researchers in-
correctly inferring relationships when these are not present. Multicollinearity is tested
by extracting a correlation matrix between the variables included in a regression model,
and their particular relationship. Correlation over 0.50 is considered high, 0.30-0.50 is
considered moderate but acceptable, and below 0.30 is considered low.
Correlation is measured using a Pearson’s correlation matrix. The Pearson’s cor-
relation matrix measures the degree of linear association between independent variables
(Brooks, 2008). The matrix values range from a minimum of -1, to the maximum of +1.
-1 describes a perfect negative relationship between variables, and +1 describes a per-
fect positive relationship between variables. If variables have a correlation of zero, they
are orthogonal (Brooks, 2008). These variables are perfectly independent of each other’s
values. Thus, the inclusion of these variables will not a↵ect the relative coe cients.
In addition, a variance inflation factor test could be performed. Variance inflation
factor tests will assess the existence of any multicollinearity by quantifying how the indi-
vidual variable’s variance is inflated by the presence of other independent variables. By
examining each independent variable, and how they are impacted by other independent
variables, we can assess whether there exists any multicollinearity between independent
variables. The variance inflation factor tests, any value below ten is typically considered
acceptable. O’brien (2007) concludes that the variance inflation factors needs to be as-
sessed in the context of other factors that influence the stability of the estimates of the
regression coe cient.
Normally distributed error observations - The error variance should be ap-
proximately normally distributed, i.e. no significant skew either over or under the mean
(Greene, 2012). A violation of the assumed normal distribution might reduce or hinder
the ability of researchers to calculate precise confidence intervals or if coe cients are sig-
nificantly di↵erent from zero (Greene, 2012). The error distribution is sometimes skewed
by the presence of outliers, which might create biases. It may then be necessary to remove
these outliers in order to present more reliable results (Brooks, 2008). A visual presen-
tation may be helpful to determine the extent to which a distribution is non-normal. In
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economic and social sciences, error distributions are often skewed, have kurtosis, or both.
Skewness is the bias of the distribution, or the degree to which the distribution is slanting
to either side of the mean. Kurtosis measures the size of the tails. According to Brooks
(2008, p. 161), leptokurtic distributions are common in financial and economic time se-
ries, and in the residuals of these series. Leptokurtic distributions have ”fatter” tails and
a higher peak than normally distributed variables.
The dataset should not show significant forms of outliers, high leverage points, or
highly influential points. Significant outliers are checked using scatter plots and the
studentized residuals in a stem and leaf plot. All values that exceed the absolute value of
2 are then evaluated more carefully. As mentioned in Section 4.2, it is not necessarily wise
to remove outliers, since these represent actual and possibly valuable observations. Even
though they skew the predictions, removing too many may artificially improve the fit of
the model (Brooks, 2008). We used stem and leaf plots to test for high leverage points
and the leverage versus squared residual plot. Observations which exceeded the value
of ((2*k)+2)/n, where k is the number of independent variables and n is the number
of observed values, are carefully evaluated. The leverage versus squared residual plot
produces an overview on how each outlier a↵ects the regression. Cook’s distance is used
to check for highly influential points. All values above 4/n are listed and thoroughly
assessed. The higher the value, the more influential the data point is with regards to the
predicted line.
Autocorrelation - Regression is based on independence of observations. When
autocorrelation is present, however, the value of observations are likely to be a↵ected
by previous observations, i.e. a dependency within the data.13 Autocorrelation is often
present in samples where the observations are not picked randomly, but from the same
source, such as panel and time series data. The impact of autocorrelation in regression
models is ine cient ordinary least squares estimators (Brooks, 2008, p. 149). This is likely
to reduce the predictive value of independent variables and inflate the R-squared value, or
predictive value, of the model (Brooks, 2008). When testing for autocorrelation, the tests
are conducted on residuals, since the population disturbances cannot be observed (Brooks,
2008, p. 149). To test whether autocorrelation is present, we performed Wooldridge’s test
for autocorrelation in panel data (Wooldridge, 2010). This test will reveal whether there is
13http://www.statisticssolutions.com/autocorrelation/
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any autocorrelation. However, it will not indicate which particular type of autocorrelation
(Petersen, 2009).
Clustering - One subgroup of autocorrelation is called clustering. Clustering issues
are common in panel data sampling since observations are drawn over several years for the
same firms (Cameron & Miller, 2015; Wooldridge, 2010). Constant time or firm e↵ects
may lead to misstated standard errors in the standard ordinary least squares regression.
When clusters or groups, rather than individual units are drawn from a population, it
is referred to as cluster sampling (Wooldridge, 2010). The clusters can be assumed to
be independent of each other, but observations within a cluster are correlated. This is
due to endogenous factors impacting the unit similarly over time. This e↵ect is referred
to as ”unobserved cluster e↵ects” (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 853). Clusters may appear
in two di↵erent forms: ”Across time within the same individual and across individuals
within the same group.” (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 876). If there are firm or time e↵ects,
standard error values will be lower in the unadjusted procedures. However, if the sample
contains a large enough number of clusters, with an appropriate cluster size, it is possible
to control the e↵ect and calculate more accurate standard errors (Wooldridge, 2010).
When a large number of clusters is present in the sample, researchers should base their
inferences on cluster-robust standard errors (Cameron & Miller, 2015). If not, there is a
risk of misstating the standard errors and confidence intervals. If there are no time or firm
e↵ects, normal ordinary least squares estimates will be correct (Petersen, 2009).
When clustering on years, the consistency depends on a su ciently high number of
years. Petersen (2009) has indicated that ten years may be a too small cluster. It is
possible to cluster to account for either firm and year e↵ects, or both simultaneously.
When the number of years included is too low, the Fama-Macbeth standard errors is
typically more accurate (Petersen, 2009). Whether one should cluster on firm, years or
both depends on the source of dependence. If the time e↵ects are not fixed, clustering on
units will not provide accurate standard error estimates, and one will typically have to
cluster on firms and years simultaneously (Petersen, 2009). However, when one dimension
has significantly fewer clusters than the other, clustering on the largest dimension will
commonly yield nearly identical results to clustering on both dimensions (Petersen, 2009,
p. 460). We will perform Rogers test for standard errors in Section 5.2.2, and report
standard errors when clustering on years, firms, and normal standard errors. However, in
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our fixed e↵ects regressions in Section 6.4 and ordinary least squares in Appendix, Section
C.1, we will cluster on firms, due to the previously mentioned reasons, i.e., a much larger
number of companies than years.
5.2.2 Analyses of assumptions
We have used Stata to interpret the econometric results in our sample. The tables pre-
sented in this section have been re-scaled from the Stata output, to create more intuitive
and simplified tables. The regression models we have used for our thesis are as fol-
lows:
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a compensation committee leads to a larger proportion of
incentive-based salary for CEOs.
Proportion of incentive-based salary = ↵ +  1*Compensation committee +  2*Firm size +
 3*Owner concentration +  4*Stock return + µ
Hypothesis 2a: More incentive-based pay leads to higher total salary.
Hypothesis 2b: Compensation committee presence leads to higher total salary.
Total CEO salary = ↵ +  1*Proportion of incentive-based salary +
 2*Compensation committee +  3*Firm size +  4*Owner concentration +
 5*Debt ratio +  6*New CEO + µ
Please refer to Section 5.2.1 for definition and discussion of the assumptions.
Linear relationship - All independent variables should have a linear relationship
with the dependent variable.
Hypothesis 1: There is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and indepen-
dent variables.
Hypothesis 2: There is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and indepen-
dent variables.
Heteroscedasticity - Errors should not appear to deviate too much across the mean.
We have performed tests for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg
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and White’s test for heteroscedasticity based on our models for hypothesis 1 and 2.
Table 5.1: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White’s test for heteroscedasticity, kur-
tosis and skewness
Breusch-Pagan /
Hypothesis Cook-Weisberg White’s test Kurtosis Skewness
Hypothesis 1 0.0012 0.0001 0.1605 0.0000
Hypothesis 2 0.0712 0.0992 0.0887 0.6760
Hypothesis 1: The p-value is 0.0012 in Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg, and 0.0001 in
White’s test. Therefore, heteroscedasticity is likely to be present, and the null hypothesis
of homoscedasticity is rejected. The model has significant skewness, and a leptokurtic
distribution.
Hypothesis 2: The p-value is 0.0712 in Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg, and 0.0992 in
White’s test. Therefore, heteroscedasticity is likely to be present, and the null hypothesis
of homoscedasticity is rejected. The model has significant kurtosis, and a leptokurtic
distribution.
Multicollinearity - Independent variables should not have a high correlation. Please
refer to Section 5.2.1 for definition and discussion of the assumption of no multicollinear-
ity. We have applied Pearson’s correlation coe cient to assess the relationship between
independent variables. In Table 5.2, correlation coe cients and their significance values
are presented. Two coe cients exceed 0.5. As previously stated, this is regarded as a
high value, and multicollinearity may be an issue. However, we have deemed these to be
at an acceptable level. The values are barely over the values regarded as ”high,” and the
VIF factors are low, as seen in the Appendix, Tables C.2 and D.2.
Table 5.2: Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Compensation committee 1.0000
2. Prop. incentive-based paya 0.2403’ 1.0000
3. CEO salarya 0.4106’ 0.5331’ 1.0000
4. Firm sizea 0.2452’ 0.3090’ 0.5742’ 1.0000
5. Owner Concentration  0.2676’  0.2131’  0.1276*** 0.0489 1.0000
6. Debt ratio  0.0681  0.0788* 0.0695 0.0121 0.1177*** 1.0000
7. New CEO 0.0642  0.0363 0.1161***  0.0694  0.0070 0.0226 1.0000
8. Stock returna 0.0503 0.1158***  0.0097 0.1527’  0.0565  0.0613 0.0223 1.0000
0
p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
a Logarithm
The highest correlation is found between firm size and total CEO salary. As men-
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tioned, previous research has indicated a relationship between company size and propor-
tion of incentive-based salary (Baumol, 1967). The proportion of incentive-based salary
and total CEO salary has a high correlation as well, indicating that a relationship exists
between these variables.
Autocorrelation - Observations should be independent and not a↵ected by the previous
observation. Please refer to Section 5.2.1 for definitions and discussion regarding the
distribution of residuals and outliers. Figures are presented in the appendix, Section
B.
All tests for outliers, high leverage points, or highly influential points display be-
tween 20-50 data points that exceeds the absolute value of 2 for the studentized residuals,
(2k+2)/n for the high leverage points and 4/n for the highly influential points. To sum-
marize, the outliers observed above the predetermined value will have an adverse e↵ect
the regression. This reduces the dependability of the regression output. However, none
of the data points registered has any extreme values.
Using Wooldridge’s test for autocorrelation in panel data, we find significant autocor-
relation values for hypothesis 2. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelation
in hypothesis 1 at 5% significance level. According to Drukker (2003), the Wooldridge
test has good size and power properties in reasonably sized samples. Drukker’s sample
sizes were based on four measurements combining 500 and 1000 observations and 5 and 10
years, where larger sample sizes had higher power. Our sample includes 545 observations
across 9 years (unbalanced), and we believe that this should induce robust findings.
Table 5.3: Wooldridge’s test for autocorrelation
Hypothesis F value Confidence level
Hypothesis 1 3.697 0.0584
Hypothesis 2 10.330 0.0019
Hypothesis 1 has a confidence level of 0.0584, and we are able to reject the null hypothesis
of first-order autocorrelation at a 5% significance level. Autocorrelation may be present,
but not at 5% significance level.
Hypothesis 2 has a confidence level of 0.0019, and are unable to reject the null hypothesis
of first-order autocorrelation. Autocorrelation is likely to be present.
41
Clustering - Theory discussed in Section 5.2.1. We have concluded that auto-
correlation is present in hypothesis 2, and heteroscedasticity is present in hypothesis 1.
Therefore, we will use robust standard errors, as described in Section 5.2.1. Since Rogers
method for calculating standard errors presents unreliable standard error estimates when
clustering on too few years (Petersen, 2009), we are clustering on firms in our analyses in
Section 6. It is possible to use Fama-Macbeth method to calculate accurate time clustered
standard errors, but researchers will typically prefer to cluster on firm-level in panel data
when the number of units is larger than the number of years (Petersen, 2009).
Table 5.4: Clustering: Ordinary least squares, cluster year, and cluster company
Hypothesis 1
Variable (A) OLS (B) Cluster year (C) Cluster company
Compensation committee 0.0340** 0.0340* 0.0340
SE 0.0151 0.0167 0.0271
Firm size 0.0264’ 0.0264’ 0.0264’
SE 0.0041 0.0046 0.0066
Owner concentration  0.1316’  0.1316**  0.0136**
SE 0.0348 0.0430 0.0532
Stock return 0.0629 0.0629 0.0629
SE 0.0386 0.0505 0.0504
Industry indicator Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Hypothesis 2
Variable (A) OLS (B) Cluster year (C) Cluster company
Proportion of incentive-based pay 1.8073’ 1.8073’ 1.8074’
SE 0.1405 0.1477 0.2227
Compensation committee 0.2519’ 0.2519’ 0.2519**
SE 0.0491 0.0309 0.0960
Firm size 0.1531’ 0.1531’ 0.1531’
SE 0.0137 0.0141 0.0246
Owner concentration  0.0814  0.0814  0.0814
SE 0.1131 0.0802 0.2285
Debt ratio 0.0474*** 0.0474** 0.0474
SE 0.0167 0.0183 0.0299
New CEO 0.2735’ 0.2735** 0.2735’
SE 0.0570 0.0779 0.0641
Industry indicator Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
’p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable Hypothesis 1: Proportion of incentive-based salary
Dependent variable Hypothesis 2: Total CEO salary
Beta coe cients are constant, significance presented
SE = Standard error
5.3 Fixed and random e↵ect
Non-observed factors a↵ecting the observations in panel data are present in nearly all
longitudinal studies (Brooks, 2008). These factors can either be unit specific, such as
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firm, country, over time, or a↵ect every observation in a given period (Wooldridge, 2010).
These e↵ects often force researchers to decide whether the endogenous factor(s) are to
be treated as fixed, or random e↵ect (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 285). The endogenous, non-
observed factors can a↵ect the units in a similar way throughout the observed periods,
or no observable pattern is found. Fixed e↵ects models are more robust than random
e↵ects models since they estimate and account for unobserved factors that impact the
relationships (Wooldridge, 2010). The fixed e↵ects model is presented as (Wooldridge,
2010):
yit = X it1 1 + X it2 2 + ... + X itk k + & i + µit, t = 1, 2, ... , T
When assuming that the endogenous factor does not correlate with the indepen-
dent variables, random e↵ects estimation is typically used instead of constant e↵ects
(Wooldridge, 2010). In random e↵ects models, we no longer assume a correlation be-
tween the unit observations and non-observed factors (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore,
this method is well suited to models where one or more of the independent variables are
constant, or nearly constant, using a model with constant independent variables.
To assess whether the fixed or random e↵ects methods are most suited for our regres-
sion model, we have performed Hausman’s test (Wooldridge, 2010). The null hypothesis
is that there is no discernible di↵erence between the two methods. The null hypothesis
is rejected in both models. These results indicate that there is a constant e↵ect of the
non-observed variables, and a correlation is present between endogenous, non-observed
variables and our independent variables. Therefore, we will report fixed e↵ects in Sec-
tion 6.4, ordinary least squares in Appendix, Section D, and omit the random e↵ects
results.
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6 Results
6.1 Descriptive analysis - Hypothesis 1
Table 6.1: Summary statistics: Average and Median values of variables (2007-2015)
Key figures
Proportion of
incentive-based Owner Stock Total CEO Incentive-based Debt Firm size
Variable pay concentration return salary salary ratio (BNOK)
Mean 20.02% 57.56% 16.40% 5 906 168 1 689 014 1.49 13.775
Std. deviation 20.31% 20.68% 81.36% 5 388 721 3 228 795 1.31 45.967
Median 15.62% 59.45% 03.89% 4 236 000 580 681 1.25 1.359
p75 30.78% 73.92% 32.88% 7 094 964 2 000 000 1.98 5.888
p25 00.11% 42.05% -23.36% 2 447 000 2 515 0.67 0.435
Skewness 1.101 -0.224 3.484 2.692 4.931 2.826 5.208
Kurtosis 3.934 2.522 26.336 13.793 38.184 18.503 31.585
Mean values
Proportion of
incentive-based Owner Stock Total CEO Incentive-based Debt Firm size
Year pay concentration return salary salary ratio (BNOK)
2007 31.49% 58.38% 10.97% 6 297 621 3 014 805 1.47 21.209
2008 20.38% 59.41% -48.77% 5 282 902 1 589 666 1.78 11.010
2009 20.59% 58.67% 92.01% 6 228 701 1 496 224 1.52 13.880
2010 14.01% 58.29% 19.20% 4 808 205 1 015 846 1.29 13.843
2011 18.47% 57.96% -13.05% 5 479 775 1 293 281 1.31 12.379
2012 17.90% 57.33% 25.55% 5 588 524 1 366 877 1.38 12.739
2013 22.64% 56.34% 44.46% 6 344 893 2 160 098 1.32 13.318
2014 21.11% 56.90% 06.89% 6 382 176 1 942 913 1.61 13.736
2015 16.86% 56.25% 06.01% 6 446 590 1 542 396 1.74 13.762
Total 20.02% 57.56% 16.40% 5 906 168 1 689 014 1.25 13.775
Median values
Proportion of
incentive-based Owner Stock Total CEO Incentive-based Debt Firm size
Year pay concentration return salary salary ratio (BNOK)
2007 30.77% 61.35% 08.44% 3 483 000 1 000 000 1.19 3.502
2008 13.83% 64.26% -50.98% 3 354 500 470 500 1.58 1.098
2009 16.89% 61.66% 59.55% 3 873 000 520 000 1.43 1.297
2010 07.66% 61.45% 07.46% 3 241 000 245 000 1.05 1.846
2011 14.88% 58.12% -15.98% 4 386 400 595 960 1.23 1.223
2012 14.05% 59.45% 10.22% 4 380 579 513 768 1.19 1.343
2013 19.76% 52.39% 12.96% 4 500 773 859 573 1.17 1.725
2014 19.71% 57.46% 02.46% 4 934 000 876 800 1.38 1.725
2015 10.61% 53.23% 02.28% 5 032 852 438 849 1.28 0.984
Total 15.62% 59.45% 03.89% 4 236 000 580 680 1.25 1.359
Figures are not adjusted for inflation
Firm size measured by market capitalization
Table 6.1 presents a summary of the dependent and independent variables in our sam-
ple.
The average proportion of incentive-based salary across all years, sectors, and firms
is 20.02% of total salary. There are some variances between years and industries, as seen
in Table 6.1, and 6.2, with the average proportion of incentive-based salary ranging from
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a minimum of 14.01% in 2010 to a maximum of 31.49% in 2007. Additionally, the share
of incentive-based salary, i.e. bonus, stock options and stock grants, were significantly
reduced in the years after 2007. These figures increased somewhat in the following years,
before decreasing again in 2015. This may have been due to the financial crisis in 2007 and
2008, and the ”oil crisis” starting at the end of 2014. The mean value of CEOs incentive-
based salary in absolute values ranges from NOK 1 015 846 in 2010, to a maximum of
NOK 3 014 805 in 2007. The mean of total incentive-based salary is NOK 1 689 014. The
average value is higher than median values for all years, suggesting a positive skew. We did
not find any steady increasing or decreasing tendency in the size of CEOs incentive-based
salary. However, there is a significant disparity between years.
Table 6.2: Salary di↵erences between sectors
Total CEO salary
Sector Mean Median Incentive-based Observations
Energy 8 071 333 6 731 408 23.28 % 106
Finance 10 003 954 5 650 000 25.44 % 21
Industry 4 244 073 2 810 000 13.58 % 123
IT 4 841 835 3 267 000 24.47 % 99
Supply 4 459 079 4 334 715 23.30 % 18
Consumer goods 4 325 204 3 192 000 18.92 % 57
Materials 11 725 126 11 820 000 20.82 % 28
Health 2 809 207 2 953 044 16.18 % 31
Consumable 6 105 600 5 591 385 16.18 % 28
Real estate 4 643 082 4 400 500 13.88 % 22
Telecom 12 983 131 12 569 000 32.22 % 9
Incentive-based pay is measured as a proportion of total salary
The low level of observations for each industry per year may make it di cult to
generalize the results. The real estate sector reports the lowest average proportion of
incentive-based salary. This sector is considered a safe investment with lower profitability
and fluctuations.14 The highest mean value is found in the telecom sector. However, the
only company in this sector is Telenor, which is one of the largest firms on Oslo Stock
Exchange, while the finance sector reports the second highest average value. Again, the
mean values are greater than the median values for all years, suggesting a positively skewed
distribution, which is confirmed by Table 6.1. This e↵ect is common and has led to many
researchers using median values instead of mean values when performing descriptive anal-
yses since it reduces the impact of extreme observations in the descriptive analyses. We
14https://www.ssb.no/priser-og-prisindekser?de=Boligpriser+og+boligprisindekser++
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have not been able to find any strong tendency of increasing or decreasing proportion of
incentive-based salary. The bonuses of CEOs may be dependent on several non-observed
factors, such as industry, norms, general economic environment, company policies, alter-
native employment options of executives, CEO personality, and the relationship between
the CEO and chair of the board.
The total salary per year does not show any noticeable trend and has fluctuated
among years. However, there was an apparent dip in the years after the financial crisis
of 2007. The total salary for CEOs was back at 2007 levels in 2013, but a larger pro-
portion of the wages were paid as fixed salaries, i.e. salary, benefits in kind and pension
agreement.
Table 6.3: Average and median proportion of incentive-based CEO salaries in firms with
and without compensation committees
Firms with Firms without
compensation committees compensation committees
Year Mean Median Mean Median
2007 40.84 % 37.35 % 24.09 % 23.15 %
2008 31.19 % 19.26 % 10.43 % 00.44 %
2009 24.37 % 22.06 % 16.00 % 08.31 %
2010 16.20 % 12.64 % 11.59 % 00.29 %
2011 23.44 % 22.71 % 10.94 % 00.69 %
2012 22.10 % 22.69 % 10.69 % 00.48 %
2013 24.68 % 25.36 % 18.89 % 11.51 %
2014 24.87 % 24.51 % 14.16 % 02.24 %
2015 17.80 % 18.37 % 15.02 % 01.03 %
Total 23.78 % 22.10 % 14.58 % 06.47 %
Table 6.3 displays the mean and median proportion of incentive-based salary of firms
with and without compensation committees. As seen in Figure 6.5b, there is an indication
of increasing similarity in the share of incentive-based salary between companies with and
without compensation committees implemented. A peak was reached in 2015 when firms
without compensation committees had a higher average incentive-based pay in absolute
values than firms with the committee. This is our last year of collected data, so we are
unable to state whether this is a passing e↵ect, or sustained in the following years. We
find this interesting, due to the ”oil crisis” beginning in November 2014, and extending
throughout 2015. As seen in Table 6.3, implementation of compensation committees leads
to larger variation in the proportion of incentive-based salaries.
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Perhaps compensation committees, while failing to keep total CEO salary in check,
are able to reflect performance and punish CEOs for poor performances. However, if the
incentive-based salary is replaced by fixed salary, the e↵ect could essentially be meaning-
less. This could be a further confirmation of the ”lucky dollars” theory in management
power, wherein CEOs are rewarded for impacts on profitability beyond their control, but
not ”punished” for similar adverse e↵ects, as predicted by Wallsten (2000). If the board
expected the CEO to be willing to take risks in order to increase profitability while not
having to worry about losing income, this could make sense (Wallsten, 2000). In addi-
tion, CEOs may not be able to directly impact the profitability to such a degree that they
should be held accountable for failing results, e.g. when the price of one barrel of North
Sea oil dropped from USD 110 per barrel to USD 64 within a few months.15 A year later,
a barrel was valued at USD 28.16 Companies that have implemented a compensation
committee tend to have both higher total incentive-based salary and larger proportion of
incentive-based salary. However, this may be due to a larger average firm size. We have
attempted to analyze this possibility empirically in Section 6.2.2.
Figure 6.1: Fixed and Incentive-based salaries between (2007-2015)
(a) Fixed salaries between 2007 and
2015
(b) Incentive-based salary between
(2007-2015)
15http://www.dn.no/nyheter/okonomi/2014/12/20/0755/oljeprisfall-gir-enorme-milliardtap-for-
norge
16http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/olje-og-energi/ny-bunnotering-laveste-oljepris-siden-
2003/a/23598060/
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Figure 6.2: Use of compensation committees (2007-2015)
Similarly, there was a tendency of the proportion of incentive-based salaries becoming
increasingly similar for firms with and without compensation committees, as seen in Figure
6.3a. There are many possible reasons for this development, some of which may be: 1)
Increased information requirements in norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og selskapsledelse,
and firms had to increase their diligence both in reporting the salary components and
pay-for-performance sensitivity. 2) Firms have been a↵ected by the present standards,
and norms have ”forced” firms without the committee to increase their bonuses for CEOs
to conform to standards. 3) CEOs have required increased bonuses to be willing to change
jobs, which has led more firms to increase the use of incentive schemes.
Figure 6.3: Incentive components by year (2007-2015)
(a) Proportion of incentive-based
salary (2007-2015)
(b) Incentive-based salary (2007-2015)
Figure 6.3b presents the relative use of di↵erent incentive-based salary components
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between 2007 and 2015. The value and use of bonuses are much larger compared to option
and stock grants, and the absolute value of option grants had severe reductions in 2008
and 2015, which may indicate that the reported values stem from exercised grants, rather
than the future value of awarded grants. However, the high value of option grants in 2007
may be due to the previously mentioned change in 2007: The Norwegian government
settled option grants in firms where they were a majority shareholder, and ruled out
future use of option plans.
Agency theory has indicated that owners that hold a relatively large share of a firm
are more willing to take on monitoring costs since they will reap the benefits of this
themselves (Randøy & Strøm, 2014). Whenever one owner assumes the responsibility to
increase returns, other owners will be able to ”free ride.” Any utility maximizing actor
is not likely to take action or spend resources on monitoring, since the benefit may not
outweigh the disadvantages, such as direct cost, stress, reduced reputation, and conflicts.
In firms with one large and dominant owner, this forces the majority shareholder to take
on an active role, since other shareholders will find the cost too high relative to rewards.
Table 6.6 presents the proportion of incentive-based salaries in firms above and below
median owner concentration. There seems to be a weak negative relationship between the
share of incentive-based wages and owner concentration, indicating a lower proportion
of incentive-based pay in firms with a few large owners. However, these results suggest
significant variability and may be impacted by other factors.
Table 6.4: Proportion of incentive-based salary in firms above and below median owner
concentration
Above median Below median
owner concentration owner concentration
With Without With Without
compensation compensation compensation compensation
Year committees committees committees committees
2007 28.78 % 20.18 % 47.88 % 31.91 %
2008 26.60 % 07.38 % 33.64 % 20.11 %
2009 21.03 % 12.94 % 26.22 % 24.68 %
2010 13.48 % 11.36 % 17.78 % 12.06 %
2011 20.14 % 10.77 % 25.84 % 11.23 %
2012 19.34 % 09.61 % 25.12 % 13.49 %
2013 25.08 % 15.27 % 24.41 % 25.73 %
2014 22.28 % 14.74 % 26.56 % 13.06 %
2015 20.25 % 12.29 % 16.38 % 19.88 %
Total 21.51 % 12.59 % 25.35 % 18.83 %
As mentioned, larger companies have generally had a higher proportion of incentive-
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based salaries than smaller firms. This may be due to the increased size, which may lead
to more stress and pressure from outside stakeholders for the CEO to maintain control of
the company, and related stress and pressure on monitoring for the CEO. We expected
that some of this e↵ect might have been due to a more dispersed ownership in firms with
larger market capitalization. This e↵ect is not strong, however, and there is a nearly
constant relationship between owner concentration and market capitalization. There are
notable deviations from the mean, and the constant relationship may be due to the large
state ownership in some of Norway’s largest publicly listed firms. At any rate, there is no
strong relationship between firm size and concentration of ownership.
Table 6.5: Stock returns in firms with and without compensation committees
Firms with Firms without
compensation committees compensation committees
Year Mean Median Mean Median
2007 01.53 % 07.79 % 18.44 % 11.58 %
2008 -45.31 % -57.61 % -51.96 % -41.15 %
2009 114.28 % 75.87 % 64.92 % 47.09 %
2010 29.47 % 18.55 % 07.78 % 00.00 %
2011 -07.03 % -12.41 % -22.20 % -19.04 %
2012 24.25 % 10.49 % 27.78 % 09.94 %
2013 39.54 % 07.53 % 53.36 % 23.07 %
2014 06.67 % 02.46 % 07.32 % 02.20 %
2015 02.15 % 03.18 % 13.59 % 01.39 %
Total 18.86 % 05.18 % 12.85 % 00.00 %
Table 6.5 and Figure 6.4 presents stock returns in companies with and without com-
pensation committees. The stock returns have trended similarly in the two groups, except
for some deviations at the positive and negative peaks. With a closer alignment between
CEO and owners, which should lead to more motivated CEOs, we expected companies
with a compensation committee to deliver higher returns. Table 6.5 indicates small devi-
ations between the companies. There is also a relative increase in the use of compensation
committees in companies from 2007 to 2015, signaling increased similarities between firms
with regards to this. Based on agency theory, the assumption is that bonuses should re-
flect the actual performance of firms. Therefore, we believe a natural extension of this
might be that an average of all bonuses paid could reflect the performance of all firms.
There seems to be a linear relationship between the proportion of incentive-based salary
on stock returns, indicating neither a positive or negative e↵ect of CEOs incentive and
stock returns in the same years.
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Figure 6.4: Stock returns with and without compensation committees (2007-2015)
6.2 Empirical results - Hypothesis 1
As stated in section 3.1.4, Hypothesis 1 is: the presence of a compensation committee leads
to a larger proportion of incentive-based salary for CEOs. This hypothesis is grounded
in agency theory, where interests of the principal and the agent are meant to be aligned
by implementing incentives. Since compensation committees specialize in executive re-
muneration, we believe these committees will apply and adapt prevailing theories when
deciding upon CEO pay.
6.2.1 T-test of hypothesis 1
When dividing our sample by the median value of market capitalization, we found an
apparent di↵erence with regards to compensation committee establishment. In accordance
with our belief, and previous literature, our sample shows an increase in the proportion of
incentive-based salary as company size increases. Our regression models in Section 6.2.2,
wherein market capitalization has a significant impact on the proportion of incentive-based
salary, support this statement.
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Table 6.6: Proportion of incentive-based salary in firms above and below median firm size
Above median Below median
firm size firm size
With Without With Without
compensation compensation compensation compensation
Year committees committees committees committees
2007 42.72 % 29.73 % 35.58 % 18.46 %
2008 38.20 % 07.59 % 22.08 % 11.54 %
2009 21.52 % 24.57 % 28.76 % 11.43 %
2010 16.59 % 21.45 % 15.54 % 05.79 %
2011 29.51 % 15.28 % 15.10 % 08.89 %
2012 27.27 % 13.16 % 14.91 % 09.31 %
2013 31.03 % 27.39 % 14.09 % 12.66 %
2014 31.03 % 24.99 % 17.59 % 08.43 %
2015 22.64 % 32.65 % 12.33 % 03.27 %
Total 28.30 % 22.79 % 17.31 % 09.73 %
Firms below median firm size have a lower proportion of incentive-based salary, re-
gardless of compensation committee presence. Further, companies above the median are
more likely to have a higher proportion of incentive-based salary, regardless of compensa-
tion committee presence. Firms below the median are also less likely to have implemented
the committee, while the opposite is true above the median.
Table 6.7: Compensation committee observations in firms above and below median size
Compensation committee implemented Above median size Below median size
Yes 192 (69.57 %) 134 (48.55 %)
No 84 (30.43 %) 142 (51.45 %)
We performed a t-test of the relationship between compensation committees and the
proportion of incentive-based salary. The t-test is carried out to assess whether di↵erences
in means between groups or observations are due to normal variation or could be due to
genuine di↵erences within the population (Brooks, 2008). The t-test presents significant
di↵erences in the average proportion of incentive-based salary between firms with and
without a compensation committee established.
Table 6.8: T-test: Hypothesis 1
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Observations with compensation committee 326 0.2378 0.0111 0.2008
Observations without compensation committee 226 0.1458 0.0129 0.1943
Diff = mean(0) mean(1) t =  5.3641
H0 : diff = 0 d.f = 550
Ha : diff < 0 Ha : diff ! = 0 Ha : diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
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Conclusion: There is a significant di↵erence in the proportion of incentive-based pay in
firms with and without compensation committees. The null hypothesis of no di↵erence in
means is rejected.
6.2.2 Tobit analysis
A large number of observations will often lead to small di↵erences becoming significant
when performing a t-test (Brooks, 2008). However, this di↵erence may be due to endoge-
nous factors. For example, larger firms are more likely to have larger and more competent
boards. This might lead to more sub-committees being implemented, such as compensa-
tion committees (Main & Johnston, 1993). Large companies are also more likely to include
more sophisticated and complex remuneration schemes. These two factors combined has
led to uncertainty as to where the di↵erences in salary originated.
Maximum likelihood models, such as Tobit, are concerned with maximizing the log-
likelihood function (Brooks, 2008), not minimizing the residual sum of squares, as in
ordinary least squares models. Therefore, ”the normal adjusted R-squared values ceases
to have any real meaning” (Brooks, 2008 p. 520). Instead, we have reported the squared
correlation between the dependent variable and our model (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 680).
The rho-value presents the contribution of the panel component in our Tobit analyses,
any value larger than zero indicates that the Tobit model adapted for panel data samples
is more suited to analyze the relationship than ”normal,” non-panel Tobit analyses. As
seen in Table 6.9, all rho values are larger than zero, indicating that a panel e↵ect is
present in the relationship between our dependent and independent variables. We have
reported partial e↵ects, as the original variable coe cients reported from Tobit analyses
represent the impact on a latent variable (Wooldridge, 2010). The partial e↵ect signifies
the ”true” impact of the variables.
To produce more robust standard errors, we used a bootstrap method. Heteroscedas-
ticity and non-normality present severe issues when present in Tobit analyses (Arabmazar
& Schmidt, 1982; Wooldridge, 2010). The bootstrap method is likely to reduce the issue
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2010). However, we encountered
some problems when applying bootstrap to model b, due to collinearity issues because
of the large number of dummy variables. Therefore, a significant ratio of calculations
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within each session was not completed. This led us to report the normal standard errors
in model b. We have verified against Tobit analyses with bootstrap, and there were only
minor standard error deviations and no change of significance values.
Table 6.9: Panel data Tobit: Hypothesis 1.
Variable - Model a 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a
Compensation committee 0.0244 -0.0080 -0.0122 -0.0119
Partial e↵ect 0.0131 -0.0044 -0.0068 -0.0066
Firm size 0.0510’ 0.0517’ 0.0508’ 0.0492’
Partial e↵ect 0.0282 0.0285 0.0283 0.0274
Owner concentration -0.2073*** -0.2056***
Partial e↵ect -0.1154 -0.1145
Stock return 0.0267
Partial e↵ect 0.0149
Constant 0.1263’ -0.9396’ -0.9490’ -0.8102’ -0.8146’
Obs 552 551 551 546 545
Prob > Chi 0.3690 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Correlation 0.0577 0.0955 0.0911 0.1389 0.1415
Wald chi2 0.81 32.48 29.87 44.61 41.69
Log-likelihood 31.729 55.006 55.051 57.911 57.314
rho 0.4762 0.4991 0.5058 0.4654 0.4635
Variable - Model b 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b
Compensation committee 0.0371 0.0049 0.0008 0.0016
Partial e↵ect 0.0202 0.0028 0.0005 0.0009
Firm size 0.0554’ 0.0550’ 0.0538’ 0.0513’
Partial e↵ect 0.0313 0.0311 0.0307 0.0293
Owner concentration -0.1676’ -0.1640***
Partial e↵ect -0.0955 -0.0935
Stock return 0.0450
Partial e↵ect 0.0293
Constant 0.1961 -1.1953’ -1.1909’ -1.0470’ -1.0490’
Obs 552 551 551 546 545
Prob > Chi 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Correlation 0.1194 0.1822 0.1842 0.2127 0.2163
Wald chi2 46.59 88.75 88.96 97.83 100.27
Log-likelihood 53.620 77.308 77.325 78.114 77.983
rho 0.4464 0.4685 0.4654 0.4390 0.4375
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Sector Y Y Y Y Y
0
p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable: Proportion of incentive-based salary
Table 1: Without indicators
Table 2: With indicators
Contrary to our hypothesis, the variable compensation committee has no significant
impact on the proportion of incentive-based salary in the Tobit regression. This result is
constant throughout both models. In model 1a, our model is not significant, reporting a
Wald Chi of 0.81. The probability of this model being more precise than a model with
no variables is 0.3690. A low value indicates a significant di↵erence from models without
any independent variables included. This is surprising, as we would expect the variable
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compensation committee to have at least some impact on the dependent variable. Further,
compensation committee presence has a non-significant, slightly negative influence in 3a,
4a, and 5a.
Firm size has a positive impact on the proportion of incentive-based salary, and a
significant relationship throughout both models. Previous research has indicated that
company size is one of the most significant variables in explaining the size of executive
compensation. Firm size is significant in all regressions. Several researchers have found
similar results, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Randøy
and Strøm (2014). As previously discussed, there seems to be a relationship between the
presence of compensation committees and company size. Firm size controls for the e↵ect
of higher market capitalization as an explanation for a greater proportion of incentive-
based salary, rather than compensation committee presence.
Owner concentration has a negative coe cient, indicating a negative impact on the
proportion of incentive-based salary as predicted in section 6.1, and by Bøhren (2012).
The results are significant in both models. Boards increase the proportion of incentive-
based salary to compensate for the reduced control by less concentrated ownership, pre-
sumably to increase interest alignment. Since lower owner concentration enhances the
need for monitoring, CEOs typically have a higher need for incentive alignment in their
remuneration schemes. The proportion of incentive-based salary is not impacted by share
performances, signaling that stock returns do not a↵ect CEO pay.
The Tobit regression output does not report any adjusted R-squared. However, we
have computed the correlation between our model and the dependent variable for all
regression models, since this is similar to R-squared in normal, ordinary least squares
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 680). This value is at its highest in 5b, with all independent
variables included.
When including year and sector indicators, both coe cients and partial e↵ects have
increased for the independent variables. The covariance between our model and the
dependent variable has increased as well.
Conclusion: We are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no impact of compensation
committees on the proportion of incentive-based salary.
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6.2.3 Comparison of models
To summarize, the presence of a compensation committee has no significant positive im-
pact on the proportion of incentive-based salary, as indicated by our Tobit model. To the
contrary, the e↵ect may be negative. The results suggest that the proportion of incentive-
based salary is more likely to be impacted by firm size and owner concentration than
compensation committee presence. This is further supported by the fact that larger com-
panies are found to be more likely to have implemented a compensation committee.
Table 6.10: Tobit, ordinary least squares and fixed e↵ect - Comparison
Tobit OLS Fixed e↵ect
Variable Without (a) With (b) Without (a) With (b) Without (a) With (b)
Compensation Committee -0.0199 0.0016 0.0345 0.0340 -0.0564** -0.0385
Firm size 0.0492’ 0.0513’ 0.0246’ 0.0265’ 0.0574’ 0.0540’
Owner Concentration -0.2056*** -0.1640*** -0.1480*** -0.1317** -0.1224 -0.1148
Stock return 0.0267 0.0450 0.0507 0.0629 0.0019 0.0186
Constant -0.8146’ -1.0490’ -0.3603** -0.3151* -0.9517’ -0.9404’
Observations 545 545 545 545 545 545
Companies 76 76 76 76 76 76
Sig 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.1415 0.2163 0.1564 0.2018 0.0985 0.1368
Year N Y N Y N Y
Sector N Y N Y N N
’p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable: Proportion of incentive-based salary
With and without indicators
Overall, we believe that the Tobit model better represents the relationships between
the dependent variables and our explanatory variables, due to the large number of zero
observations of the dependent variable. As mentioned, the beta coe cients are signifi-
cantly di↵erent in Tobit models compared to regular ordinary least squares, since regular
regression models tend to overstate the constant and understates the individual coe -
cients.
6.3 Descriptive analysis - Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2a stated that more incentive-based pay leads to higher total salary, while
hypothesis 2b stated that compensation Committee presence leads to higher total salary.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, we anticipate that a significant impact from the proportion
of incentive-based pay on CEO salaries will lend support for the management power
theory, wherein CEOs are thought to extract rents and exploit shareholders for their
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own gain. The neo-institutional theory assumes that boards act according to norms and
”rules of thumb.” We believe that a compensation committee should be able to a↵ect
CEO salaries by focusing specifically on the topic. Thus, the presence of a compensation
committee should impact the size of CEO compensation.
Table 6.11: Total CEO salaries in firms with and without compensation committees
Firms with Firms without
compensation committees compensation committees
Year Mean Median Mean Median
2007 9 983 121 5 700 000 3 379 932 2 340 229
2008 7 480 320 6 300 000 3 261 277 2 134 000
2009 8 280 185 5 923 420 3 731 244 2 024 830
2010 5 689 436 4 642 951 3 829 060 2 219 000
2011 6 571 719 4 983 686 3 820 019 2 108 195
2012 6 638 839 5 109 168 3 781 982 2 355 000
2013 7 229 000 5 060 625 4 712 696 2 948 500
2014 7 400 965 6 620 239 4 501 334 3 033 000
2015 6 902 859 5 576 000 5 552 301 3 099 000
Total 7 177 696 5 460 176 4 072 017 2 687 436
The average total salary for Norwegian CEOs in the years between 2007 and 2015
was NOK 5 906 168, with significant deviations between the minimum (NOK 182 555)
and maximum (NOK 46M) figures. As seen in Table 6.15, firms with compensation
committees tend to have higher salaries than firms without them. This e↵ect is not
surprising, considering the increased likelihood of larger companies having established the
committee. Please refer to Table 6.7. There is no clear trend in these figures, except for
a strong increase in salary in firms without compensation committees between 2012 and
2015.
Figure 6.5: Salary components (2007-2015)
(a) Fixed salaries (2007-2015) (b) Total salaries (2007-2015)
57
Table 6.1 presents the average incentive-based and fixed salary per year, while Figure
6.5 presents the absolute value of incentive-based salary, fixed salary and total salary per
year visually. Clearly, the size of fixed salary was still larger than incentive-based pay for
Norwegian CEOs per 2015. As seen in Table 6.1, the incentive-based salary decreased in
the years between 2007 and 2010, and again in 2015. This coincided with periods of lower
profitability in the Norwegian economy.
The significant increase in fixed salary compared to incentive-based salary is partic-
ularly interesting. This may be due to the replacement e↵ect of fixed salary in turbulent
economic periods, as theorized in management power. In reality, perhaps the risk is not
transferred from the company to the CEO as predicted by agency theory.
Table 6.12: Total CEO salaries in firms above and below median size
Firms above Firms below
median size median size
Year Mean Median Mean Median
2007 8 481 136 5 551 000 2 958 126 2 295 000
2008 7 783 222 6 524 945 3 496 959 2 816 983
2009 9 038 195 6 031 000 3 527 265 2 496 628
2010 6 465 568 5 217 000 3 091 650 2 699 000
2011 7 563 384 5 178 000 3 585 584 2 665 000
2012 7 469 794 6 247 194 3 707 253 2 705 832
2013 8 411 805 5 951 375 3 776 911 2 993 000
2014 9 034 904 7 138 663 4 001 522 3 352 620
2015 8 320 088 7 151 136 4 671 697 3 270 241
Total 8 083 818 5 955 769 3 728 518 2 910 000
58
In Table 6.12, total salary is split by median firm size. There is a di↵erence between
total wages in the two brackets of firm size. In companies below median size, the average
value of total salaries is approximately 50% of pay in firms above median size. This is
in accordance with previous research showing that executive pay is impacted by firm size
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1974; Randøy & Strøm, 2014).
Table 6.13: Total CEO salaries in firms above and below median owner concentration
Firms above median Firms below median
owner concentration owner concentration
Year Mean Median Mean Median
2007 5 860 426 3 037 000 6 800 394 4 398 500
2008 4 717 109 3 342 000 6 010 350 4 231 000
2009 4 689 679 3 548 000 7 960 101 4 928 711
2010 4 947 054 3 241 000 4 664 396 3 350 063
2011 5 477 244 3 610 500 5 482 387 4 519 969
2012 5 532 524 3 579 000 5 952 978 4 873 699
2013 6 392 306 4 488 500 6 299 976 4 573 831
2014 6 147 855 4 831 000 6 604 163 5 221 500
2015 7 015 908 5 368 000 5 962 669 4 605 877
Total 5 702 991 4 053 000 6 149 964 4 527 485
As mentioned in section 4.3.1, larger owner concentration tend to reduce the need for
incentive alignment, as the majority owners’ monitoring increases. Agency theory predicts
that higher owner concentration should lead to lower CEO salary since owners are more
willing to spend time on monitoring, and free riders are less of a problem (Grossman &
Hart, 1980; Randøy & Strøm, 2014). Higher owner concentration will often lead to more
active shareholders, which will have an e↵ect on the proportion of incentive-based salary
(Randøy & Strøm, 2014). Thus, higher owner concentration reduces CEO pay. There
is an indication of lower total salary when the owner concentration increases. We have
measured the relationship between owner concentration and firm size, and it seems to be
nearly constant, meaning that larger firms do not tend to have more dispersed ownership.
This may be due to the majority state ownership in large Norwegian firms, as discussed
in section 6.1.
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Table 6.14: Total CEO salaries in firms above and below median debt ratio
Firms above Firms below
median debt ratio median debt ratio
Year Mean Median Mean Median
2007 6 778 620 5 055 000 6 220 902 3 243 300
2008 6 151 493 4 646 502 4 066 874 2 917 433
2009 6 285 076 4 550 214 6 160 071 3 470 000
2010 5 073 261 3 650 000 4 569 655 3 153 201
2011 5 798 542 4 829 344 5 170 970 3 880 000
2012 4 831 345 4 373 014 6 222 916 4 770 000
2013 6 466 621 4 574 772 6 680 943 4 600 000
2014 5 957 070 4 976 000 6 910 338 4 892 000
2015 7 083 599 5 689 000 5 838 836 4 081 000
Total 6 058 642 4 638 229 5 859 661 3 949 000
In Table 6.14, total CEO salaries in firms above and below median debt ratio is
presented. As stated in section 4.4, based on previous literature, we believe that increased
debt ratio will act as a source of discipline for CEOs, forcing them to turn profits to handle
the debt. This may reduce the need for exorbitant salaries, or create another incentive
for the CEO to act in shareholders best interests, and not engage in ”empire building” or
needless spending.
Table 6.15: Total CEO salaries in firms with and without CEO replacement
Firms with Firms without
CEO replacement CEO replacement
Year Mean Median Mean Median Observations
2007 - - 6 297 621 3 483 000 -
2008 8 829 854 6 670 115 4 776 194 3 314 000 6
2009 9 313 631 6 340 000 5 476 280 3 470 000 10
2010 4 656 967 3 347 349 4 840 384 3 241 000 10
2011 4 611 249 2 934 000 5 624 529 4 495 485 9
2012 7 494 125 6 418 016 5 369 848 4 053 000 7
2013 5 678 236 4 333 462 6 486 968 4 600 000 13
2014 8 278 716 5 551 000 5 977 995 4 892 000 13
2015 8 200 886 6 390 000 6 072 724 4 084 000 13
Total 7 095 026 5 236 000 5 701 714 4 082 000 81
We have collected data for a change of CEO and included both the previous and
new CEO’s salaries per year. When a firm hires a new CEO, the previous CEO is often
rewarded with ”golden handshakes,” high severance packages (Yermack, 2006). In all
years, except for 2013, hiring a new CEO led to a higher total salary. However, we have
recorded salaries for both the former and new CEO, and we cannot state with certainty
that this implies a widespread tendency of golden handshakes in Norwegian firms. The
mean value of total CEO salary in years when companies changed CEO is NOK 7 095
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026, compared to NOK 5 701 714 in years without CEO change. The 81 observations of a
CEO replacement only cover 14.67% of total observations. However, we believe that the
variable explains a significant share of total CEO pay.
6.4 Empirical results - Hypothesis 2
6.4.1 Fixed e↵ect regression
We have performed a fixed e↵ect regression to control for the possibility of non-random
e↵ects, reporting two separate results - with and without yearly indicators included as
binary variables. We cannot include sectors as binary variables, as the fixed e↵ect model
treats these as constants, removing the impact. To reduce the impact of autocorrelation
and heteroscedasticity, we have applied robust standard errors.
Table 6.16: Fixed e↵ect regression: Hypothesis 2
Variable - Model a 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 7a
Prop. of incentive-based 1.5550’ 1.5800’ 1.5046’ 1.4700’ 1.4652’ 1.4910’
Compensation committee 0.0933 0.1658** 0.1467** 0.1560** 0.1442** 0.1216*
Firm size 0.0723* 0.0696* 0.0927** 0.0953***
Owner concentration -0.6288 -0.5463 -0.5955
Debt ratio 0.0824’ 0.0742’
New CEO 0.2326’
Constant 15.0314’ 15.2396’ 14.9293’ 13.4089’ 13.8344’ 13.1808’ 13.1403’
Observations 552 552 552 551 546 546 546
Companies 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Sig 0.0000 0.2823 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.2842 0.1686 0.3520 0.4893 0.4338 0.4781 0.4906
rho 0.7123 0.7158 0.6916 0.6426 0.6577 0.6470 0.6605
Variable - Model b 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b
Prop. of incentive-based 1.6724’ 1.6721’ 1.6043’ 1.5703’ 1.564’ 1.5778’
Compensation committee -0.0534 -0.0031 -0.0109 -0.0044 -0.0096 -0.0259
Firm size 0.0684* 0.0670* 0.0865** 0.0889**
Owner concentration -0.6187 -0.5526 -0.6033
Debt ratio 0.0702’ 0.0624***
New CEO 0.2201’
Constant 15.2117’ 15.4861’ 15.2138’ 13.7334’ 14.1449’ 13.5727’ 13.5389’
Observations 552 552 552 551 546 546 546
Companies 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Sig 0.0000 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.3054 0.0015 0.3038 0.4596 0.4211 0.4640 0.4721
rho 0.7294 0.7452 0.7294 0.6834 0.6912 0.6808 0.6940
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
’p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable: Total CEO salary
Table 1: Without indicators
Table 2: With indicators
As seen in Table 6.16, the proportion of incentive-based salary has a significant
impact throughout both models, indicating a positive relationship with the dependent
variable. The introduction of control variables does not reduce the e↵ect of the propor-
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tion of incentive-based salary significantly. Rho-values are consistently high, indicating a
substantial impact by non-observed factors.
In model a, compensation committee presence has a positive coe cient and a sig-
nificant impact, except for in 2a. In model b, compensation committee presence has a
negative, non-significant coe cient. These results indicate a negligible impact of compen-
sation committee presence on total CEO salary when the yearly indicator is included in
the regression.
Firm size is significant, with a positive coe cient in model a and b. The results
suggest that firm size has a strong relationship with the dependent variable, and an
increase in company size is likely to increase total salary. Contrary to our belief, owner
concentration does not have a significant impact on the size of CEO pay.
Debt ratio is highly significant in model a and b, signaling a strong positive rela-
tionship between debt ratio and total CEO pay. Previous literature has indicated that
a higher debt ratio will restrict free cash flow (Bøhren, 2012), and we believe a higher
debt ratio should discipline CEOs and curb excessive spending. The independent variable
new CEO is positive and significant in both models. The results suggest that some of the
increase in salary may be due to high severance packages, golden handshakes or increase
in pay when firms change CEO is picked up by our control variable.
The R-squared in model a ranges from 16.86% to 49.06%. In the full model, the
variable compensation committee is significant, while the proportion of incentive-based
salary, firm size, debt ratio and new CEO are highly significant. Owner concentration is
non-significant in both models.
The R-squared value increases in model b, which indicates that the yearly indicator
has some e↵ect on the total salary. Model b explains between 0.02% to 47.21% of the
variation in the dependent variable. The proportion of incentive-based salary is significant
throughout all regressions in the fixed e↵ect model.
Conclusion: Hypothesis 2a: Proportion of incentive-based pay has a significant impact on
total CEO salary. The null Hypothesis of no significant impact is rejected.
We find an impact of compensation committee presence on total CEO salary in model
a, which lends partial support to Hypothesis 2b. However, the impact is not significant
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in model b.
Conclusion: Hypothesis 2b: We find no definite impact of compensation committee pres-
ence on total CEO salary. The null hypothesis of no significant relationship is not re-
jected.
6.4.2 Comparison of models
Table 6.17: Ordinary least squares and fixed e↵ect - Comparison
OLS Fixed e↵ect
Variable Without (a) With (b) Without (a) With (b)
Prop. of incentive-based 1.6767’ 1.8073’ 1.4910’ 1.5778’
Compensation committee 0.3013*** 0.2518** 0.1216* -0.0259
Firm size 0.1724’ 0.1530’ 0.0953*** 0.0889**
Owner concentration -0.1310 0.0814 -0.5955 -0.6033
Debt ratio 0.0560** 0.0474*** 0.0742’ 0.0624’
New CEO 0.2822’ 0.2735’ 0.2326’ 0.2201’
Constant 11.1108’ 10.9838’ 13.1403’ 13.5389’
Observations 546 546 546 546
Companies 76 76 76 76
Sig 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.5425 0.6399 0.4906 0.4721
Year N Y N Y
Sector N Y N N
’p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable: CEO total salary
With and without indicators
To summarize, the proportion of incentive-based salary is significant in the fixed e↵ect
model, and in the ordinary least squares model in Appendix D. Based on management
power theory, we suggested that incentive-based salary was a way for CEOs to extract rent
from the companies, thereby increasing their total pay. The results lend support to our
hypothesis that CEO total salary is dependent on the proportion of incentive-based salary.
The significance of the impact is lower in the fixed e↵ect model than in the ordinary least
squares model.
Compensation committee presence is significant in the ordinary least squares model,
while it is only significant in model a in the fixed e↵ect regression. The impact of compen-
sation committees in fixed e↵ect model b is negative. However, it is not significant.
Firm size is significant both in the ordinary least squares model, and in the fixed
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e↵ect model. The variable owner concentration has a negative, non-significant impact
in both models. The debt ratio is significant in the ordinary least squares model a and
b. In both fixed e↵ect models, debt ratio is significant. The variable change of CEO is
significant in throughout both models.
6.5 Robustness
We performed robustness tests to assess the stability of relationships across di↵erent mea-
sures of both the independent and dependent variable. We have previously evaluated the
consistency of our results by applying di↵erent regression models to the data, finding sim-
ilar results across methods. In this section, we have presented the models using di↵erent
measures of the same variables. We have included indicators in the robustness tests for
both of our hypotheses.
6.5.1 Robustness - Hypothesis 1
Table 6.18: Tobit Hypothesis 1 - Robustness
Original model Robustness 1 Robustness 2
Std. Std. Std.
Variable Beta error Beta error Beta error
Compensation commitee 0.0016 0.0196 0.4781 1.2698 0.0008 0.0260
Partial e↵ect 0.0009 0.0051 0.396 0.9212 0.0005 0.0148
Firm size 0.0513’ 0.0087 1.8259’ 0.3385 0.0534’ 0.0084
Partial e↵ect 0.0293 0.0051 1.3385 0.2280 0.0304 0.0049
Owner concentration -0.1640*** 0.0676 -5.5474*** 2.7143 -0.1803*** 0.0621
Partial e↵ect -0.0935 0.0380 -4.0666 1.8856 -0.1028 0.0357
Stock return 0.0450 0.0488 -0.2082 2.4057 0.0124 0.0404
Partial e↵ect 0.0256 0.0277 -0.1526 1.7651 0.0071 0.0231
Constant -1.0491’ - -29.8771*** - -1.0423’ -
Obs 546 545 544
Companies 76 76 76
Prop > Chi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Correlation 0.2163 0.2462 0.1833
Wald chi2 100.27 74.86 97.92
Log-likelihood 77.983 -1460.682 64.428
rho 0.4375 0.3813 0.4303
Year Y Y Y
Sector Y Y Y
0
p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Robustness 1: Dependent variable - Absolute incentive-based salary (logarithm)
Robustness 2: Independent variable stock return (previous year)
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Table 6.18 present the robustness tests for hypothesis 1. In robustness 1, we have changed
the dependent variable from proportion of incentive-based salary to absolute value of
incentive-based salary. There is no change in relationships between the independent vari-
ables and the dependent variable in robustness 1. The results are similar to the original
Tobit model. The coe cients are di↵erent due to the change from percentage value to an
absolute value of the dependent variable, which makes it di cult to interpret the impact
of the change in the coe cients and standard deviations. However, the significance of the
independent variables has not changed from the original model to robustness 1.
In robustness 2, we have used stock return in the previous year as an independent
variable instead of the proportion of incentive-based salary. This was done to assess the
impact of a profitable year on next year’s salary. We would expect high stock returns in
the previous year to evoke higher salaries for CEOs in the next year, and possible rent
extraction. However, the results indicate no significant relationship between returns and
higher variable pay, suggesting that higher returns not necessarily impact the bonuses of
CEOs of Norwegian firms. The robustness test shows the same relationship between the
independent and dependent variables, and the significance of coe cients are similar to
the original model.
6.5.2 Robustness - Hypothesis 2
Table 6.19: Fixed e↵ect hypothesis 2 - Robustness
Original model Robustness 3 Robustness 4
Std. Std. Std.
Variable Beta error Beta error Beta error
Prop. of incentive-based 1.5778’ 0.1824 0.0304’ 0.0045 1.6085’ 0.1902
Compensation committee -0.0259 0.0747 -0.0238 0.0747 -0.0055 0.0738
Firm size 0.0889** 0.0340 0.1206*** 0.0423 0.1508** 0.0616
Owner concentration -0.6033 0.3985 -0.7257* 0.4252 -0.4780 0.3806
Debt ratio 0.0624’ 0.0188 0.0671*** 0.0221 0.0512** 0.0203
New CEO 0.2201’ 0.0549 0.2077’ 0.0556 0.2348’ 0.0527
Constant 13.5389’ 0.7091 12.8658’ 0.8503 12.0548’ 1.3814
Companies 76 76 76
Sig 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.4721 0.4797 0.5670
Year Y Y Y
0
p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Robustness 1: Independent variable proportion of variable salary changed to absolute variable salary (logarithm)
Robustness 2: Independent variable firm size changed to assets
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Table 6.19 presents the robustness tests for hypothesis 2. In robustness 3 we have changed
the independent variable proportion of variable salary to the absolute value of variable
salary. The robustness test indicates no di↵erence in the relationship between any vari-
ables and is similar to the original model, other than owner concentration, which is sig-
nificant in robustness 3.
In robustness 4, we have used assets instead of market capitalization to control for
firm size. Previous research has used assets as a measure of company size (Randøy &
Nielsen, 2002). As assets signify the size of companies, we expected assets to return
similar results as market capitalization. The results indicate small di↵erences in the
relationship between the independent and dependent variables, and the significance is
similar to the original model.
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7 Discussion and conclusion
In this thesis, we have explored whether compensation committee presence has an impact
on CEO salaries. We have discussed CEO salary through the lenses of agency theory, man-
agement power theory, and neo-institutional theory. Rather than spending resources on
monitoring agents, it may be more e cient to induce desirable behavior through incentive-
alignment. Agency theory predicts that incentive-based pay would increase alignment
between the CEO and owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen
& Murphy, 1993). We hypothesized that the presence of a committee that specializes
in aligning the interest between the CEO and owners would increase the incentive-based
proportion of salaries. Conyon (1997) found conflicting results regarding compensation
committee impact on CEO pay, but overall his results indicated a negative relationship
between compensation committee presence and salary growth. Our results suggest that
there is no significant relationship between compensation committee presence and a higher
percentage of incentive-based salary, similar to the findings of Main and Johnston (1993).
Furthermore, firm size and owner concentration are more likely to impact the proportion
of variable salary than compensation committee presence. We also found indications that
larger firms were more inclined to have implemented the committee, indicating that firm
size may be the primary determinant of compensation schemes in firms listed on Oslo
Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess.
Behavioral agency theory predicts that several non-observed factors impact the mo-
tivation of agents. After assessing our results, we believe that our measure of incentive
alignment may be too simplistic. The proportion of incentive-based salary does not cap-
ture the exact scheme of payments and incentives added to increase e↵ort. Furthermore,
as CEOs are often risk-averse, the e↵ect of future rewards is often weak. CEOs will of-
ten prefer reliable income streams (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Therefore, our measures may
not fully capture the complexities of CEO motivation. These subtle di↵erences within
compensation schemes may be the added value from remuneration committees.
According to management power theory, owners are unable to control and determine
executive salary. Salary schemes can be a camouflage of rent extraction (Bebchuk &
Fried, 2003). Furthermore, Bebchuk et al. (2002) remarked that CEOs are self-serving
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and able to minimize risk while maximizing rents. We find a strong, positive relationship
between the proportion of incentive-based salary and total CEO pay. This may indicate
that bonuses and equity pay is, in reality, an added incentive to the CEO, and does not
replace the fixed salary as predicted by agency theory. This may be because firm size
impacts both the proportion of incentive-based pay and the total CEO salary (Jensen &
Murphy, 1993), even after controlling for firm size. Previous research has indicated that
firm size is the primary influence on the size of CEO compensation (Conyon & Peck, 1998;
Jensen & Murphy, 1993; Randøy & Strøm, 2014; Sigler, 2011).
Neo-institutional theory predicts that firms act according to norms and ”rules of
thumb.” Therefore, pay schemes are transferred with a small degree of adaptation be-
tween di↵erent settings, industries, and cultures (Main et al., 2005; Peetz, 2015). Conyon
(1997) found that compensation committees had a negative impact on growth in CEO
pay. Main and Johnston (1993) found an association between compensation commit-
tee presence and higher CEO remuneration. Their study had slightly di↵erent indepen-
dent variables. Furthermore, it compared firms cross-sectionally, rather than longitudinal
(Main & Johnston, 1993). Similarly, Conyon and Peck (1998) found a constant positive
relationship between compensation committee presence and the size of CEO pay. We find
partial support for compensation committee presence impacting total CEO pay. The lack
of a consistent positive relationship between compensation committee presence and CEO
salary size might indicate support for the Lake Wobegon e↵ect, as theorized by Hayes and
Schaefer (2009). Every CEO believes that their skills are above average, and their com-
pensation should reflect this. This leads to a ”pattern bargaining,” wherein CEOs with
lower salaries negotiate based on salaries of highly paid comparable executives. Further-
more, boards may believe that investors value highly paid CEOs, as high compensation
is a sign of an excellent talent (Hayes & Schaefer, 2009). We believe that our inability to
discern a substantial impact of compensation committee presence on CEO salaries might
add support for neo-institutional theory; boards may be unwilling to change their rou-
tines, and will rather act according to norms and habits. Thus, salary schemes may result
from inertia, and boards not wanting to act unconventionally, even when a designated
sub-committee is implemented to align interests. Perhaps compensation committees are
established symbolically, in line with Westphal and Zajac’s (1993) research on long-term
incentive plans.
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7.1 Future research
We find an increasing similarity among firms with and without compensation committees
during the surveyed time frame, which might indicate that more companies are adhering
to the Norwegian Corporate Governance code from norsk utvalg for eierstyring og sel-
skapsledelse. The increased similarity may suggest that Oslo Stock Exchange is becoming
more strict regarding the ”comply or explain” principles, or perhaps that shareholders
value the presence of compensation committees, even though their impact is not dis-
cernible to us. The relative increase in implementation of compensation committees may
also be a product of non-observed factors, such as plans regarding listings on foreign stock
exchanges where this committee is mandatory, conformity, and ”rules of thumb.”
While we used a dummy variable to indicate the presence of compensation commit-
tees, we have no measure of whether the compensation committee is comprised of insiders
or by independent board members. Bebchuk et. al (2002) predicted that independence
would reduce management power and increase boards ability to create more valuable com-
pensation schemes. However, some researchers have called this assumption into question
(Murphy, 2012; Daily et al., 1998). Research performed by Newman and Moses (1999)
supported claims that insider boards frequently used remuneration schemes that were bi-
ased in favor of executives, i.e. a lower relation between compensation and performance.
They found no evidence of higher total salary in these firms. Future research might look
further into the relationship between the composition of compensation committees in
Norwegian firms and CEO salary. Another interesting line of research might be to assess
whether employee representatives participate in compensation committees and whether
this impacts the size and composition of CEO salaries.
Furthermore, we attempted to measure both the number of meetings and members
of the committee per year for compensation committees, but were unable to obtain a
su cient number of observations to present valuable findings. It may be useful to assess
the impact of number of meetings attended, to see whether it has an impact on the com-
plexity and quality of the remuneration schemes, as predicted by Hermanson, Tompkins,
Veliyath, and Ye (2012). Finally, our results may not be entirely generalizable, since our
sample is non-random. There may be some standard features of firms left out, such as
poor reporting habits, low profitability leading to bankruptcy, or delisting from Oslo Stock
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Exchange. A complete sample of every firm listed within the same time frame might yield
di↵erent results.
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Appendices
A Complete lists of firms
A.1 Sample
ISIN Company name
NO0003021909 ABG Sundal Collier Holding ASA
NO0003108102 Acta Holding ASA
NO0003502809 Polaris Media ASA
NO0010234552 Aker ASA
NO0003097503 AKVA group
NO0010123060 Apptix ASA
NO0003572802 Arendals Fossekompani
NO0010073489 Austevoll Seafood ASA
NO0010607971 Awilco LNG ASA
FO0000000179 Bakkafrost
NO0003094104 Belships ASA
NO0010379779 Bergen Group ASA
NO0010014632 Biotec Pharmacon ASA
NO0003095312 Birdstep Technology ASA
NO0003111700 Borgestad ASA
NO0010360266 Bouvet ASA
NO0003087603 Byggma ASA
NO0003064107 Data Respons ASA
NO0010295603 DET Norske Oljeselskap ASA
NO0010019649 EVRY ASA
NO0003035305 Ekornes ASA
NO0010358484 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA
NO0004822507 ATEA ASA
NO0003089005 Fred Olsen Energy ASA
NO0010262687 GC Rieber Shipping ASA
NO0004913609 Goodtech ASA
NO0010365521 Grieg Seafood
NO0004288200 Gyldendal ASA
NO0004306408 Hafslund ASA
NO0010257728 Havila Shipping ASA
NO0003067902 Hexagon Composites ASA
NO0010598683 Hofseth Biocare ASA
NO0003070609 IDEX ASA
NO0003072803 IM Skaugen ASA
NO0003055808 Intex Resources ASA
NO0010001120 Itera Consulting Group ASA
NO0003079709 Kitron ASA
NO0003033102 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA
NO0010605371 Kværner ASA
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NO0003096208 Leroy Seafood Group ASA
NO0010219702 Link Mobility Group ASA
NO0010159685 Medi-Stim ASA
NO0010657604 Multiclient Geophysical
NO0004895103 Namsos Trafikkselskap
NO0010289200 NattoPharma
NO0003055501 Nordic Semiconductor ASA
NO0005052605 Norsk Hydro ASA
NO0010550056 North Energy ASA
NO0010331838 Norway Royal Salmon
NO0010196140 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA
NO0010317811 Norwegian Property ASA
NO0010657448 Ocean Yield ASA
NO0005638858 Olav Thon Eiendomsselska
NO0010040611 Opera Software ASA
NO0003733805 Orkla ASA
NO0010564701 Panoro Energy
NO0010000045 Photocure ASA
KYG7153K1085 Polarcus Limited
CY0100470919 Prosafe SE
NO0003103103 Q-Free ASA
NO0010310956 Salmar ASA
NO0003028904 Schibsted ASA
NO0010612450 Selvaag Bolig ASA
NO0005418004 Skiens Aktiemolle ASA
NO0010268451 Songa O↵shore ASA
NO0010429145 Spectrum ASA
NO0010096985 Statoil ASA
NO0010063308 Telenor ASA
NO0003194201 Tide ASA
NO0005668905 Tomra Systems ASA
NO0003049405 TTS Marine ASA/TTS Group asa
NO0005806802 Veidekke ASA
NO0010691298 Western Bulk ASA
NO0003471404 Wilhelmsens Wilhelmsen ASA
NO0010252356 Wilson ASA
NO0010208051 Yara International ASA
Table A.1: Sample (76 firms)
A.2 Out of sample
ISIN Company name
NO0003078107 AF Gruppen ASA
NO0010307135 Aqua Bio Technology ASA
GB00B5LJSC86 Awilco Drilling Plc
NO0010283211 Badger Explorer ASA
NO0003106700 Bionor Pharma ASA
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NO0010635816 Bonheur ASA
NO0010657505 Borregaard ASA
CY0100120910 Deep Sea Supply Plc
NO0010081235 Diagenic ASA
NO0010070063 DOF ASA
NO0010263023 Eidesvik O↵shore ASA
NO0003215303 Farstad Shipping ASA
NO0010739683 Höegh LNG Holding ltd
NO0010284318 Interoil Exploration
NO0010205966 Navamedic
NO0004135633 Norske Skogindustrier ASA
NO0010379266 Norwegian Energy Company ASA (noreco)
NO0003399909 Odfjell ASA
NO0010199151 Petroleum Geo Services ASA
NO0010085574 Petrolia Drilling ASA
NO0010112675 Renewable Energy Corp.
NO0010572589 Saga Tankers
JE00B61ZHN74 Scottish Salmon Company Limited
CY0101162119 Seabird Exploration
NO0010455793 Sevan Drilling ASA
NO0010187032 Sevan Marine ASA
NO0010771223 Solstad O↵shore ASA
NO0003390007 Solvang ASA
NO0010360175 Storm Real Estate ASA
Table A.2: Out of sample (29 firms)
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B Testing of Ordinary least squares assumptions
B.1 Homoscedasticity
Figure B.1: Visual representation of heteroscedasticity in Hypothesis 1
Figure B.2: Visual representation of heteroscedasticity in Hypothesis 2
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B.2 Normality of error distribution
Figure B.3: QNorm in Hypothesis 1
Figure B.4: QNorm in Hypothesis 2
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Figure B.5: Normality of error in Hypothesis 1
Figure B.6: Normality of error in Hypothesis 2
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C Ordinary least squares and Fixed e↵ect - Hypoth-
esis 1
C.1 Ordinary least squares
We have performed stepwise ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors
as discussed in section 5.2.2, compensating for the cluster e↵ects. In addition, we have
tested with and without yearly indicators. Some of the assumptions that ordinary least
squares regressions are based on may not have been fulfilled. However, the model is still
presented for completeness.
Table C.1: Ordinary least squares: Hypothesis 1.
Variable - Model a 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a
Compensation committee 0.0777*** 0.0572** 0.0349* 0.0345
Firm size 0.0264’ 0.0227’ 0.0253’ 0.0246’
Owner concentration -0.1509*** -0.1480***
Stock return 0.0507
Constant 0.1235’ -0.3936’ -0.3482’ -0.3018’ -0.3603’
Observations 552 551 551 546 545
Companies 76 76 76 76 76
Sig 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.0560 0.0939 0.1218 0.1547 0.1564
Variable - Model b 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b
Compensation committee 0.0765*** 0.0501* 0.0338 0.0340
Firm size 0.0301’ 0.0263*** 0.0277’ 0.0265’
Owner concentration -0.1369** -0.1317**
Stock return 0.0629
Constant 0.2057’ -0.4937 -0.4407’ -0.3728’ -0.3151***
Observations 552 551 551 546 545
Companies 76 76 76 76 76
sig 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.1140 0.1612 0.1774 0.1997 0.2018
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Sector Y Y Y Y Y
0
p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable: Proportion of variable salary
Table 1: Without indicators
Table 2: With indicators
None of the variables have a high variance inflation factor, and we do not believe
that multicollinearity presents large issues in hypothesis 1. Please refer to section 5.2.1
for a discussion of further multicollinearity measures.
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Table C.2: Variance inflation factors: Hypothesis 1
Variable Variance inflation factor (VIF)
Compensation Committee 1.17
Firm Size 1.11
Owner Concentration 1.10
Stock return 1.03
Mean VIF 1.10
C.2 Fixed e↵ect regression
We have performed a fixed e↵ect regression to control for the possibility of non-random
e↵ects. We have reported two separate results for our fixed e↵ects model. We have
performed a fixed e↵ect regression without yearly indicators, and one with these indicators
included as binary variables.
Table C.3: Fixed e↵ect: Hypothesis 1
Variable - Model a 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a
Compensation committee -0.0459 -0.0583** -0.0562** -0.0564**
Firm size 0.0563’ 0.0580’ 0.0574’ 0.0574’
Owner concentration -0.1216* -0.1224*
Stock return 0.0019
Constant 0.1964’ -1.0303’ -1.0318’ -0.9493’ -0.9517’
Observations 552 551 551 546 545
Companies 76 76 76 76 76
sig 0.1018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.0577 0.0955 0.0636 0.0976 0.0985
Variable - Model b 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b
Compensation committee -0.0301 -0.0393 -0.0380 -0.0385
Firm size 0.0558’ 0.0566’ 0.0559’ 0.0540’
Owner concentration -0.1156 -0.1148
Stock return 0.0186
Constant 0.1628’ -1.0448’ -1.0363’ -0.9549’ -0.9404’
Observations 552 551 551 546 545
Companies 76 76 76 76 76
Prob 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.0038 0.1165 0.0927 0.1287 0.1309
Year Y Y Y Y Y
0
p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable: Proportion of variable salary
Table 1: Without indicators
Table 2: With indicators
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D Ordinary least squares - Hypothesis 2
As for hypothesis 1, we have performed a stepwise clustered regression analyses. The
regression coe cients and robust standard errors have been reported in section 5.2.2.
The coe cients and significance of the selected variables have been reported below. In
addition, we have included yearly and sector indicators to assess the possibility of these
a↵ecting CEO salaries.
Table D.1: Ordinary least squares: Hypothesis 2
Variable - Model a 1a 2a 3a 4a 5a 6a 7a
Prop. of incentive-based 2.5116’ 2.1722’ 1.6867’ 1.6296’ 1.6594’ 1.6768’
Compensation committee 0.6252’ 0.4566’ 0.3374*** 0.3110*** 0.3188*** 0.3013***
Firm size 0.1644’ 0.1698’ 0.1681’ 0.1724’
Owner concentration -0.0997 -0.1293 -0.1310
Debt ratio 0.0573* 0.5560**
New CEO 0.2822’
Constant 14.8694’ 14.9524’ 14.6573’ 11.3032’ 11.2749’ 11.2344’ 11.1108’
Observations 552 552 552 551 546 546 546
Companies 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Sig 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.2829 0.1670 0.3665 0.5164 0.5165 0.5255 0.5425
Variable - Model b 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b
Prop. of incentive-based 2.4235’ 2.1768’ 1.7980’ 1.7893’ 1.8050’ 1.8074’
Compensation committee 0.5583’ 0.3918*** 0.2673***’ 0.2658*** 0.2752*** 0.2519**
Firm size 0.1481’ 0.1496’ 0.1467’ 0.1531’
Owner concentration 0.0699 0.0793 0.0814
Debt ratio 0.0497 0.0474
New CEO 0.2735’
Constant 15.5878’ 15.7421’ 15.2942’ 11.7332’ 11.6499’ 11.6290’ 11.4619’
Observations 552 552 552 551 546 546 546
Companies 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Sig 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.4625 0.3239 0.5120 0.6043 0.6019 0.6075 0.6234
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0
p < 0.001, ***p < 0.010, **p < 0.050, *p < 0.100
Dependent variable: Total CEO salary
Table 1: Without indicators
Table 2: With indicators
Table D.2: Variance inflation factors: Hypothesis 2
Variable Variance inflation factor (VIF)
Prop. of incentive-based pay 1.19
Compensation committee 1.19
Firm size 1.20
Owner concentration 1.15
Debt ratio 1.02
New CEO 1.01
Mean VIF 1.13
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E Selection bias
We did not expect to find significant di↵erences between debt ratios of sample and firms
out of sample. No significant di↵erence was found. The reported p-value is 0.3282.
Table E.1: T-test debt ratio: Sample and firms left out of sample
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Sample 552 1.4886 0.0556 1.3053
Out of sample 224 1.3821 0.4005 5.9939
Diff = mean(0) mean(1) t =  0.3955
H0 : diff = 0 d.f = 774
Ha : diff < 0 Ha : diff ! = 0 Ha : diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.3463 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.6926 Pr(T > t) = 0.6537
There is a significant di↵erence between the ownership concentration of our main
sample and firms left out of sample. The reported p-value is 0.0025. However, in ac-
tual percentage terms, the di↵erence is 4.92% which we do not consider to impair our
results significantly. The significance is related to the large sample sizes (212 and 538
observations).
Table E.2: T-test owner concentration: Sample and out of sample
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Sample 547 0.5756 0.0088 0.2068
Out of sample 212 0.5234 0.0135 0.1964
Diff = mean(0) mean(1) t =  3.1615
H0 : diff = 0 d.f = 757
Ha : diff < 0 Ha : diff ! = 0 Ha : diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0008 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0016 Pr(T > t) = 0.9992
There is no significant di↵erence between our sample and the firms left out of sample.
The reported p-value is 0.5709.
We have operationalized firm size by market capitalization, as reported by Oslo Stock
Exchange.
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Table E.3: T-test stock return: Sample and out of sample
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Sample 551 0.1640 0.0347 0.8136
Out of sample 215 0.1650 0.1387 2.0332
Diff = mean(0) mean(1) t = 0.0104
H0 : diff = 0 d.f = 764
Ha : diff < 0 Ha : diff ! = 0 Ha : diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.5041 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.9917 Pr(T > t) = 0.4959
Table E.4: T-test market capitalization: Sample and firms left out of sample
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Sample 552 Bn. 13.78 1.96e+089 4.60e+10
Out of sample 223 Bn. 3.38 6.75e+08 1.01e+10
Diff = mean(0) mean(1) t =  3.3432
H0 : diff = 0 d.f = 773
Ha : diff < 0 Ha : diff ! = 0 Ha : diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0004 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0009 Pr(T > t) = 0.9996
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F Reflection note
In this thesis, we have explored whether the presence of a compensation committee has
an e↵ect on the proportion of incentive-based salary. We have also tested which e↵ect the
presence of a compensation committee and proportion of incentivized based salary have
on total CEO salary.
We have tested three hypothesis in our thesis. Hypothesis 1 builds on agency theory,
which predicts that the interest between the CEO and owners will align when incentivized
salary is presented. Implementing a compensation committee, with the sole purpose of
specializing in remuneration and alignment of interest, should increase the proportion of
incentivized salary. Hypothesis 2a is built on management power theory. Management
power theory main contribution is that the board is unable to control the pay-setting
process, and salary is considered a way of rent extraction for the CEO. An increase in the
proportion of incentive-based salary should increase CEO total salary. Neo-institutional
theory suggests that CEO compensation is a product of inertia, and boards not wanting
to act unconventionally. Boards will go with the norm when designing remuneration
schemes. With hypothesis 2b, when taking neo-institutional theory into consideration,
we predicted that the presence of a compensation committee, with the sole purpose of
monitoring and incentivizing the CEOs salary, would be able to di↵erentiate from firms
without a compensation committee. Therefore, the presence of a compensation committee
would lead to higher total pay.
The dataset contains self-collected observations from annual reports, forvalt.no and
the Titlon database. We collected information about 76 companies listed on the Oslo
Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess from the year 2007 to 2015. The 76 companies are
registered with a varying number of years included; the dataset is therefore classified
as an unbalanced panel data. In total, we have 552 observations. We have used the
following statistical methods to test our hypothesis: In model 1, we used t-test and
regression, while we used regression in hypothesis 2. The results from hypothesis 1 indicate
that there is no relation between the presence of a compensation committee and higher
proportion of incentivized salary. In hypothesis 2a we find results that higher proportion
of incentivized salary is positively related to higher salary. The results lend support to
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management power theory as incentivized salary is used as a form of rent extraction for
the CEOs. In hypothesis 2b we find partial result on the relationship between the presence
of compensation committee and higher total salary. However, the null hypothesis of no
relationship between compensation committee and higher total salary is not rejected in
our full model.
Internationalization
As companies plan for future strategies, certain preparation is necessary to meet the
requirements of forthcoming events. As an example, some Norwegian enterprises may
want to expand into foreign stock exchanges. In the same way that Oslo Stock Exchange
have certain requirements for companies before they can be listed, foreign stock exchanges
will have their requirements. As an example, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
requires all listed companies to have an implemented compensation committee. There are
also certain rules to independence among the members of the compensation committee.
For a firm preparing for listing on the New York Stock Exchange, the requirement of an
established compensation committee must be fulfilled.
Di↵erent from agency theory, the establishment of the compensation committee is
bound to be a result of boards pursuing the alignment of interest between the principal and
agent. An example for di↵erent motivation behind the establishment of a compensation
committee can be the result of international standards, or legislated code of conduct
regarding corporate governance.
As another example, firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange are required to report
their financials according to the international financial reporting standard (IFRS). Inter-
national standards and legislations that have an e↵ect on IFRS will directly influence
and shape the reporting of Norwegian listed companies. E.g., IFRS requires disclosure of
executive compensation. The point being, exogenous and international requirements will
have an impact on the corporate governance in Norwegian firms.
Innovation
Remuneration schemes might not come across as innovative, but a firm should be able to
create innovative schemes that lead to a competitive advantage.
Neo-institutional theory predicts that remuneration schemes are based on norms and
inertia. Therefore, the e↵ect of incentive-based payments might be non-existent in the
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firms that adopt remuneration schemes from industry norms, market expectations, etc.
As mentioned in the thesis, remuneration schemes should be customized to fit the CEO.
Agency theory predicts that by compensation the agent, the principal and agent will have
to align interest. CEOs will, therefore, be motivated to make the best possible decisions
for long run value maximization. In hypothesis 1 of our master thesis, we predicted that
firms with an implemented compensation committee, with the sole purpose of handling
the CEOs remuneration, would lead to aligned interest between the CEO and owner.
Thus, creating an advantage. However, we found no results indicating a higher degree of
the proportion of incentivized salary in the presence of a compensation committee.
According to human capital theory, the CEO’s contribution to long-run value creation
in organizations depends on the CEO unique expertise, existing network and network
building capabilities, relationships, and other skills of the CEO. Agency theories prediction
of the CEOs ability to increase stock returns and long-run value maximization to the
shareholders are driven by monetary rewards are a too simplistic solution to the problem.
The behavioral agency theory main contention is that motivation comes from other sources
than monetary rewards. Non-monetary rewards are an important aspect to take into
account when developing remuneration schemes.
By applying incentives, that consider both monetary and non-monetary rewards,
and that are based upon individual preferences, will increase the chances for interest
alignment. Therefore, by not following the norm, like neo-institutional theory predicts
that boards do, companies can be able to create a competitive advantage through the
remuneration of the CEO.
Responsibility
Norwegian companies are responsible for a substantial part of the growth in the Norwegian
economy. It is therefore in the stakeholders best interest to have the corporate governance
of Norwegian companies follow specific guidelines. In our research, we find an increase in
the use of compensation committees in the Oslo Stock Exchange. The similarities indicate
an increase in alignment with norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og ledelse Section 9. We
also find many companies adhering the ”comply or explain” principle when not having an
established compensation committee. According to the research of KPMG on NUES, the
recommendations have a good foothold in Norwegian companies, and the adherence of
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the ”Comply or explain” principle is overall good. However, there are still improvements
to be made.
Adhering to the corporate governance guidelines and accounting standards gives
transparency, and as mentioned, is in the stakeholders best interest. Earlier account-
ing frauds and scandals have had tremendous repercussions for stakeholders. As an ex-
ample, when Enron went bankrupt in 2001, numerous employees and stakeholders lost
their pension funds, savings, jobs, etc., and stock prices in the financial markets dropped
drastically. Since repercussions from scandals and fraud are so dramatic, adherence to
the Norwegian corporate governance guidelines and accounting rules is therefore in the
stakeholders best interest. Norwegian listed companies are statutory to following norsk
anbefaling for eierstyring og ledelse, and by Norwegian accounting law, must adhere to
the ”comply or explain” principle. The e↵ect is transparency in the companies responsible
for the majority of prosperity and growth in Norway.
89
